Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons^™

Ceo Power, Corporate Social Responsibility, And Firm Value: A Test Of Agency Theory, Zhichuan Li

Business Publications

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether firms with powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) tend to invest (more) in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities as the over-investment hypothesis based on classical agency theory predicts.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper tests an alternative hypothesis that if CSR investment is indeed an agency cost like the over-investment hypothesis suggests, then those activities may destroy firm value.

Findings

Using CEO pay slice (Bebchuk et al., 2011), CEO tenure, and CEO duality to measure CEO power, the authors show that CEO power is negatively correlated with firm’s choice to engage in CSR …

Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation For Corporate Social Responsibility, Zhichuan Li

Business Publications

We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shareholder-friendly corporate governance are more likely to provide compensation to executives linked to firm social performance outcomes. Also, providing executives with direct incentives for CSR is an effective tool to increase firm social performance. The findings provide evidence identifying corporate governance as a determinant of managerial …