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Societal Trust And Corporate Tax Avoidance, Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, Jimmy Lee, Chee Yeow Lim, Gerald Lobo
Societal Trust And Corporate Tax Avoidance, Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, Jimmy Lee, Chee Yeow Lim, Gerald Lobo
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Using aninternational sample of firms from 25 countries and a country-level index for societal trust, we document that societal trust is negatively associated with tax avoidance, even after controlling for other institutional determinants, such as home country legal institutions and tax system characteristics.We explore the effects of two country-level institutional characteristics—strength of lega linstitutions and capital market pressure—on the relation between societal trust and tax avoidance. We find that the relation between trust and tax avoidance is less pronounced when legal institutions in a country are stronger and is more pronounced when capital market pressure is stronger. Finally, we examine …
The Evolution Of The International Corporate Tax Regime, 1920-2008, Richard Woodward
The Evolution Of The International Corporate Tax Regime, 1920-2008, Richard Woodward
Books/Book Chapters
No abstract provided.
Tax Knowledge Diffusion Through Individual Auditor Network Ties: Evidence From China, Chee Yeow Lim, Terry Shevlin, Kun Wang, Yanping Xu
Tax Knowledge Diffusion Through Individual Auditor Network Ties: Evidence From China, Chee Yeow Lim, Terry Shevlin, Kun Wang, Yanping Xu
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This study investigates whether network ties via sharing the same individual auditor influences the diffusion of tax avoidance knowledge. We find that firms with greater connection to low-tax firms through audit partners have lower effective tax rates (ETRs), consistent with tax avoidance knowledge being shared among firms through individual auditor network. The influence of audit network ties on tax avoidance at focal firms is stronger when partners’ tenure in low-tax firms is longer, and when partners have social connection with the top executives of focal firms. In addition, audit fees of focal firms with auditor network ties to low-tax firms …