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Full-Text Articles in Accounting
The Role Of Convex Equity Incentives In Managers’ Forecasting Decisions, Young Jun Cho, David Tsui, Holly I. Yang
The Role Of Convex Equity Incentives In Managers’ Forecasting Decisions, Young Jun Cho, David Tsui, Holly I. Yang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Prior literature suggests that voluntary disclosures of forward-looking information tend to lead to capital market benefits, but these disclosures may also result in negative capital market consequences if subsequent performance falls below expectations. We, therefore, hypothesize that convex equity incentives, which reward managers for stock price gains while limiting their exposure to losses, should promote greater voluntary forward-looking disclosure. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a significantly positive association between equity incentive convexity and forecast issuance and frequency. We also find that the positive association is more pronounced for firms with higher sales volatility and managers with shorter tenure, in …
Information Externalities And Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence From A Major Customer’S Earnings Announcement, Young Jun Cho, Yongtae Kim, Yoonseok Zang
Information Externalities And Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence From A Major Customer’S Earnings Announcement, Young Jun Cho, Yongtae Kim, Yoonseok Zang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine the relation between information externalities along the supply chain and voluntary disclosure. Information transfers from a major customer's earnings announcement (EA) can substitute for its supplier's disclosure. Conversely, if the customer's EA increases uncertainties regarding the supplier's future prospects, it can increase the demand for disclosure. After controlling for information incorporated in supplier returns, we find that the supplier is more likely to issue earnings guidance after the customer's EA when the EA news deviates more from the market's expectation. The positive effect of the customer's news on earnings guidance is weaker when common investors, supply-chain analysts, or …
Guidance Frequency And Guidance Properties: The Effect Of Reputation-Building And Learning-By-Doing, Sanjeev Bhojraj, Robert Libby, Holly I. Yang
Guidance Frequency And Guidance Properties: The Effect Of Reputation-Building And Learning-By-Doing, Sanjeev Bhojraj, Robert Libby, Holly I. Yang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Different firms issue earnings guidance at dramatically different rates. We suggest that frequent guiders more likely represent a type of firm that is attempting to develop a reputation for enhanced disclosures through their guidance issuances. Furthermore, the desire to build a reputation and the opportunities to learn provided by issuing more frequent guidance should translate into frequent guiders providing higher quality guidance than occasional guiders. We examine our hypotheses in three stages. First, we find that guidance frequency is positively correlated with variables associated with reputation with capital market participants and reputation in product and labor markets. Second, our cross-sectional …
Capital Market Consequences Of Managers' Voluntary Disclosure Styles, Holly I. Yang
Capital Market Consequences Of Managers' Voluntary Disclosure Styles, Holly I. Yang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This paper studies the capital market consequences of managers establishing an individual forecasting style. Using a manager-firm matched panel dataset, I examine whether and when manager-specific credibility matters. If managers' forecasting styles affect their perceived credibility, then the stock price reaction to forecast news should increase with managers' prior forecasting accuracy. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the stock price reaction to management forecast news is stronger when information uncertainty is high and when the manager has a history of issuing more accurate forecasts, indicating that individual managers benefit from establishing a personal disclosure reputation.
Do Management Eps Forecasts Allow Returns To Reflect Future Earnings? Implications For The Continuation Of Management’S Quarterly Earnings Guidance, Jong-Hag Choi, Linda Myers, Yoonseok Zang, Dave Ziebart
Do Management Eps Forecasts Allow Returns To Reflect Future Earnings? Implications For The Continuation Of Management’S Quarterly Earnings Guidance, Jong-Hag Choi, Linda Myers, Yoonseok Zang, Dave Ziebart
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Using 18,253 firm-year observations from 1998 through 2003, we build on literature suggesting that more informative disclosures allow returns to better reflect future earnings, and test whether management earnings per share forecasts and their characteristics influence the future earnings response coefficient (FERC). We find that FERCs are greater for forecasting firms and when forecasts are more frequent or precise. We suggest that more frequent and more precise forecasts assist investors in better predicting future earnings. Importantly, we find that quarterly and short-term forecasts incrementally increase the association between returns and future earnings beyond annual and long-term forecasts; thus, even short-term, …
Moral Hazard, Firms’ Internal Governance And Management Earnings Forecasts, Jimmy Lee
Moral Hazard, Firms’ Internal Governance And Management Earnings Forecasts, Jimmy Lee
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This paper investigates the role of management earnings forecasts in mitigating information asymmetry between investors andmanagers relating to moral hazard, and explains how earnings guidance facilitates monitoring. I demonstrate that firms that are more susceptible to moral hazard problems and more difficult to monitor are also more likely to issue annual earningsforecasts and they do so more frequently. In addition, I examine how firm internal governance drives forecasting decisions andshow that stronger board governance and managerial equity incentives are associated with higher likelihood and frequency of forecast issuance. Finally, I provide robust evidence that managerial equity incentives are associated with …