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Sacred Heart University

Taxation

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A Theory Of Vertical Political Interaction In Cigarette Taxation, Khawaja Mamun Aug 2012

A Theory Of Vertical Political Interaction In Cigarette Taxation, Khawaja Mamun

WCBT Faculty Publications

This paper examines the political interdependence of federal and state cigarette tax rates. We develop a lobby group model where a state’s endogenous reaction to a federal cigarette tax hike depends crucially on the political responses of the cigarette producer and anti-smoking lobby groups.


Tobacco Politics And Electoral Accountability In The United States, Per G. Fredriksson, Khawaja Mamun Jan 2009

Tobacco Politics And Electoral Accountability In The United States, Per G. Fredriksson, Khawaja Mamun

WCBT Working Papers

This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ state cigarette tax choices, and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975-2000 data, we find evidence that governors in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production and tobacco manufacturing, and which are densely populated by smokers, appear prone to reputation-building. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.


Gubernatorial Reputation And Vertical Tax Externalities: All Smoke, No Fire?, Per G. Fredriksson, Khawaja Mamun Jan 2009

Gubernatorial Reputation And Vertical Tax Externalities: All Smoke, No Fire?, Per G. Fredriksson, Khawaja Mamun

WCBT Working Papers

This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ responses to changes in federal cigarette taxes (i.e. vertical tax interactions). Using 1975-2000 state cigarette tax data, we find that reputation-building strategies affect the nature of vertical tax externalities. Lame duck governors exhibit a more negative response to changes in the federal cigarette tax. Thus, by reducing the state tax base and by causing a decline in the state tax, an increase in the federal tax rate reduces state tax revenues in states headed by lame ducks.