Business Commons^™

Understanding Csr: An Empirical Study Of Private Self-Regulation, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: The article is a study of an important burgeoning form of regulation—private self-regulation—in the area of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Rather than taking a purely theoretical approach or a social scientific study relying publicly reported data, the article addresses the issue by way of interview based case studies. As a study in regulation it clarifies the difference between various types of self-regulation, trade associations’ codes as private self-regulation and government sponsored self-regulation. This distinction hampers efforts to understand the important aspects of motivation and compliance. This study provides empirical examination of compliance in private self-regulation. Given the impact and …

Overview Of The Evolution Of China's Central Bank And Monetary Policy: Correlation To The European Union, Alida S. Skold

Alida S. Skold

As an innovator in the financial system, China was the first to use paper currency. Eventually the form of currency was held responsible for devastating inflation and was abandoned during the Ming Dynasty. Going forward in time, uprisings and discontent have emphasized the importance of controlling inflation. The central bank is pivotal in issuing monetary policy to control inflation and to maintain financial stability as the government transforms itself from a planned economy to a mixed market economy. The transforming economy is moving toward a free market system through series of economic reforms. The correlation between China’s structure and the …

Institutional, Macro Economic Policy Factors And Foreign Direct Investment: South Asian Countries Case, Muhammad Azam, Hashim Khan, Ahmed Imran Hunjra, H. Mushtaq Ahmad, M. Irfan Chani

Ahmed Imran Hunjra (PhD)

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …