Business Commons^™

Corporations And The 99%: Team Production Revisited, Shlomitt Azgad-Tromer

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Article explores the legal manifestation of the interaction between the general public and the public corporation. Revisiting team production analysis, this Article redefines the corporate team and argues that while several constituencies indeed form part of the corporate team, others are exogenous to the corporate enterprise. Employees, suppliers and financiers contribute together to the common corporate enterprise, enjoying a long-term relational contract with the corporation, while retail consumers contract with the corporation at arm’s length, and other people living alongside the corporation do not contract with it at all. Under this organizational model, the general public may participate in …

The Changing Face Of Corporate Compliance And Corporate Governance, Sean J. Griffith, Steve Thel, Miriam Baer, Geoffrey P. Miller, Gerald Manwah, Stuart Breslow, Alan Cohen, Martin Grant, Henry Klehm Iii, Allen Meyer, Thomas C. Baxter Jr.

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

We are pleased to present this Symposium on the revolution in corporate compliance and its evolution in the financial services industry. This is the annual symposium hosted by the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law on significant topics in the realm of business law.

The format of the symposium is as follows. It begins with an introduction by Professor Sean Griffith, followed by edited transcripts of the two panel discussions and the keynote address.

The first panel is “Revolution: Challenging Corporate Norms?” and addresses the question of whether the revolution in corporate compliance challenges the established norms of corporate …

What We Talk About When We Talk About Voting: Efficiency And The Error In Empty Voting, Patricia Beck

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Under the shareholder primacy model, shareholders exercise voting power because their votes are wealth maximizing and efficient. The practice of decoupling, or the strategic separation of the right to vote on a share from the economic ownership of that share, undermines this efficiency. The decoupled investor’s interests are not aligned with maximizing the value of the corporation and decoupled investors have, to the detriment of all other shareholders, used their voting power to dictate inefficient corporate decisions. This Note advocates for proxy card disclosure of decoupled shares and subsequent voiding of the decoupled votes. In this way, only those shares …

Defining "Material, Nonpublic": What Should Constitute Illegal Insider Information?, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

It has been over fifty years since the United States Securities and Exchange Commission held that insider trading on material, nonpublic information is illegal, and despite the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act in 1984, Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act in 1988, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, there is still no clear definition of “material, nonpublic information.” This Article argues that the ambiguity of what constitutes illegal insider information enables corporate insiders to engage in profitable transactions without legal consequences. Furthermore, we argue and provide evidence that the necessity of showing a tipper’s personal benefit creates …

Altering Rules, Cumulative Voting, And Venture Capital, John F. Coyle

Utah Law Review

Legal scholars have long debated the proper balance betweenmandatory and default rules in corporate law. One group — the contractarians — maintain that corporatelaw should function as an off-the-rack set of default rules that approximate, as much as possible,the rules that the transacting parties would have agreed to if bargaining were costless. The contractarians are generally skeptical of mandatory rules because they interfere with the ability of the parties to decide for themselves how to organize their economic relationships. Another group of scholars—the anti - contractarians — have argued that corporate law should seek to achieve certain regulatory objectives separate …