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Takeover Defenses, Golden Parachutes, And Bargaining Over Stochastic Synergy Gains: A Note On Optimal Contracting, Atreya Chakraborty
Takeover Defenses, Golden Parachutes, And Bargaining Over Stochastic Synergy Gains: A Note On Optimal Contracting, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
We incorporate managerial risk aversion and stochasticity of takeover synergy gains into Harris’ (Harris, E.G. 1990. Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder welfare. Rand Journal of Economics 21, no. 4 : 614–25.) bargaining model for the coexistence of antitakeover defenses and golden parachutes in corporate charters.We show that: (i) it is not always optimal that the target-firm shareholders adopt antitakeover defenses, (ii) the size of the golden parachute is proportional to the riskiness of the synergistic gains, and (iii) the target-firm shareholders are unequivocally better-off with golden parachutes than takeover-contingent stock options.
Golden Parachutes And Shark Repellents And Shareholders' Interests: Some New Evidence, Atreya Chakraborty
Golden Parachutes And Shark Repellents And Shareholders' Interests: Some New Evidence, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
In this paper we test for the motives for adopting golden parachutes and Anti-Takeover Amendments (ATAs). Firms that exhibited financial characteristics that were associated with a greater probability of hostile raids were also more likely to adopt golden parachutes or ATAs. We also find evidence to support the hypothesis that the adoption of golden parachutes and poison pills may in fact complement each other.