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Full-Text Articles in Business

Ceo Characteristics, Ceo-Firm Match And Corporate Refocus Value, Sheng Huang Oct 2008

Ceo Characteristics, Ceo-Firm Match And Corporate Refocus Value, Sheng Huang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper investigates how CEO characteristics affect firm value through divestiture. Using a novel dataset tracking CEO’s career path, from which CEO’s talent and expertise are reasonably inferred, I find when CEOs have differing abilities across divisions of conglomerates, they more likely divest divisions that they are less qualified to manage, and focus on divisions of better match with their talents and expertise. The better match of their talents with firms’ retained assets is the source of value creation from refocusing divestiture. Divestitures that increase corporate focus but not improve the talent-asset match do not create value in long run. …


Search For Optimal Ceo Compensation: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang Jul 2008

Search For Optimal Ceo Compensation: Theory And Empirical Evidence, Melanie Cao, Rong Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We integrate an agency model with dynamic search equilibrium to study three important issues concerning executive compensation. We show that 1) the equilibrium pay-to-performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm’s specific risk, and negatively on its systematic risk, which offers a plausible explanation for the inconclusive empirical relationship between the pay-to-performance sensitivity and a firm’s total risk; 2) a growing economy simultaneously induces the growth in executive compensation and firm size; 3) the faster growth of executive compensation relative to the growth of firm size in the past decade is mostly due to the increase in firms’ specific risks.


The Impact Of Investor Protection Law On Takeovers: The Case Of Leveraged Buyouts, Jerry Cao, Douglas J. Cumming, Jeremy Goh, Meijun Qian, Xiaoming Wang Mar 2008

The Impact Of Investor Protection Law On Takeovers: The Case Of Leveraged Buyouts, Jerry Cao, Douglas J. Cumming, Jeremy Goh, Meijun Qian, Xiaoming Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the impact of investor protection on the value creation of LBOs. We find that target shareholders’ wealth gain is higher in countries with better investor protection. The impact of investor protection on takeover premium is larger for LBO than non-LBO transactions. We also find evidence suggesting that club LBOs are not priced lower than non-club deals after accounting for endogeneity problem. These results suggest that investor protection law may act as an important safeguard for minority shareholders in LBO transactions.


Do Poison Pills Increase Firm Risk?, Thomas Turk, Jeremy C. Goh, Candace Ybarra Mar 2008

Do Poison Pills Increase Firm Risk?, Thomas Turk, Jeremy C. Goh, Candace Ybarra

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Management scholars have argued that an active takeover market discourages risk-taking by managers and that takeover defenses serve to counter the risk-reducing pressures of an active takeover market. This study employs the Black and Scholes Option Pricing Model to determine whether or not adoption of poison pill securities increases investor perceptions of firm risk. The results provide evidence that the Option-Implied Standard Deviations of common stock returns increase significantly on the poison pill adoption date, on average. Furthermore, the implied standard deviations remained significantly above pre-adoption levels for several days after the poison pill adoption, suggesting that the perceived increase …


The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa Feb 2008

The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

An assumption in prior research is that debt is homogeneous and provides inappropriate governance for R&D investments. We argue that debt is heterogeneous: although transactional debt does indeed impose strict contractual constraints that provide inappropriate governance for R&D investments, relational debt has very different characteristics that provide more appropriate governance. Using a sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms that align their debt structures with their R&D investments perform better than those that are misaligned. Furthermore, firms tend to align their debt structure with R&D investments, but only after deregulation permits relatively free access to various types of debt.


Too Little Or Too Much? Untangling The Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy And Corporate Financial Performance, Heli Wang, Jaepil Choi, Jiatao Li Jan 2008

Too Little Or Too Much? Untangling The Relationship Between Corporate Philanthropy And Corporate Financial Performance, Heli Wang, Jaepil Choi, Jiatao Li

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

What is the relationship between corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance? Some scholars argue that corporate philanthropy facilitates stakeholder cooperation and helps secure access to critical resources controlled by those stakeholders, suggesting that corporate philanthropy should be positively associated with corporate financial performance. In contrast, other scholars take a negative stance, suggesting that corporate philanthropy diverts valuable corporate resources and tends to inhibit corporate financial performance. Existing empirical studies have not found conclusive evidence on the corporate philanthropy-financial performance relationship. Integrating and extending existing perspectives, this study develops the argument that the relationship between corporate philanthropy and financial performance is …