Business Commons^™

Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams

Peter Cramton

Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values …

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Reply to comments on review of rules. For ISO New England.

Efficient Relocation Of Spectrum Incumbents, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, John Williams

Peter Cramton

Changes in technologies and in consumer demands have made prior radio spectrum allocations far from efficient. To address this problem the FCC has recently reallocated spectrum for more flexible use in bands that are partially occupied by incumbent license holders. Often, it is necessary for the new license holder to relocate incumbents to make efficient use of the spectrum. Regulations structuring the negotiation between incumbent and new entrant can promote efficiency. In particular, giving the new entrant the right to move the incumbent with compensation can reduce negotiation costs and promote efficiency when there is private information about spectrum values …

A Review Of Iso New England's Proposed Market Rules, Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

For ISO New England.

A Review Of Iso New England's Proposed Market Rules, Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

This report reviews the proposed rules for restructured wholesale electricity markets in New England. We review the market rules, both individually and collectively, and identify potential problems that might limit the efficiency of these markets. We examine alternatives and identify the key tradeoffs among alternative designs. We believe that the wholesale electricity market in New England can begin on December 1, 1998. However, improvements are needed for long-run success. We have identified four major recommendations:

* Switch to a multi-settlement system.

* Introduce demand-side bidding.

* Adopt location-based transmission congestion pricing, especially for the import/export interfaces.

* Fix the pricing …

Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending-bid or a sealed-bid format. The critical distinction between formats is that an ascending auction provides the bidders with information through the process of bidding. This information is a two-edged sword. It may stimulate competition by creating a reliable process of price discovery, by reducing the winner’s curse, and by allowing efficient aggregations of items. Alternatively, the information may be used by bidders to establish and enforce collusive outcomes. Ex ante asymmetries and weak competition favor a sealed-bid design. In other cases, an ascending auction is likely to perform …

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Package Bidding, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson

Peter Cramton

An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of licenses), and the computational complexity problem (which arises from the fact that the number of possible combinations of licenses is much larger than the number of licenses). Package bidding offers the possibility of an improvement over individual-license bidding only when there are strong complementarities and the pattern of those complementarities varies across bidders. Package bidding works satisfactorily …