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Agency Costs, Charter Amendments And The Market For Corporate Control, Atreya Chakraborty
Agency Costs, Charter Amendments And The Market For Corporate Control, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
The merger wave of the 1 980s, coupled with the sophistication of investment Banks' financial engineers, brought about a bewildering array of takeover defenses: "poison pills", " classified boards", "fair price amendments", and the like. Surveys have documented steep growth in various defensive amendments adopted by firms in recent years. The Investors? Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC), in surveying 424 of the Fortune 500 firms in 1986, found that 143 had adopted poison pills, 158 had fair price amendments and 223 had board of directors divided into classes. Jarrell and Poulsen's (1987) research notes the same trend in a previous survey …
Intensity Of Takeover Defenses: The Empirical Evidence, Atreya Chakraborty
Intensity Of Takeover Defenses: The Empirical Evidence, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
This paper focuses on the construction of an index of the intensity of firms' antitakeover defenses. While many aspects of corporate behavior are qualitative in nature, an evaluation of a firm's stance and the underlying motives for its behavior often depend on the elements of a set of qualitative factors. The interactions between these factors are likely to have important implications. In this context, only a composite measure will capture these interactions and their implications for firms' actions. We focus on the creation of an ordinal measure of anti-takeover defenses and utilize the ordered probit estimation technique to relate the …