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Full-Text Articles in Business
Competition Law Reform And Firm Performance: Evidence From Developing Countries, Incheol Kim, Suin Lee, Bina Sharma
Competition Law Reform And Firm Performance: Evidence From Developing Countries, Incheol Kim, Suin Lee, Bina Sharma
Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations
We examine the effects of competition laws on firm performance in East Asian countries that have enacted antitrust legislation in the last three decades. Exploiting the staggered changes of these laws as quasi-exogenous shocks, we find that strengthened competition laws improve firm performance. Treated firms increase R&D investments and efficiency in inventory and asset management, while free cash flow decreases after reforms. Also, the effect of competition laws on firm performance is stronger with weaker corporate governance. Our findings indicate that government intervention promoting competitive market environments could benefit corporate owners in emerging markets where corporate governance is often substandard.
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey
Senior Honors Theses
Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …
Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, And Criminalization, Catarina Marvao, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Leniency Inflation, Cartel Damages, And Criminalization, Catarina Marvao, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Articles
We revisit the pros and cons of introducing cartel criminalization in the EU. We document the recent EU “leniency inflation”, whereby leniency has been increasingly awarded to many (or all) cartel members, which softens the “courthouse race” effect. Coupled with the insufficient protection of leniency applicants from damages (2014 Damages Directive), it may have led to a decrease in leniency applications and cartel convictions. Given the current level of fines, criminalization may have to be introduced. We then explore US criminal sanctions (1990–2015) to highlight potential areas of concern for EU policymakers, of which recidivism appears to be a significant …