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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Business
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From Recent Regulatory Reforms, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
In this paper, we examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence are effective in reducing earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors prior to the reforms (referred to as non-compliance firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that overall, compared to the other firms, noncompliance firms do not experience a significant decrease in the extent of earnings management from prior to the reforms to afterwards. However, we find that non-compliance firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management compared with the other firms. The results …
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From The Recent Regulatory Reform, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Xin Wang
Does Increased Board Independence Reduce Earnings Management? Evidence From The Recent Regulatory Reform, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence reduce the extent of earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors before the reforms (referred to as noncompliant firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that, while noncompliant firms on average do not experience a significant decrease in earnings management after the reforms compared to other firms, noncompliant firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management. The results are similar when we examine audit committee independence and when we use alternative proxies for information acquisition cost and …
Bank Loan Agreement And Ceo Compensation, Amine Khayati, Donald L. Ariail
Bank Loan Agreement And Ceo Compensation, Amine Khayati, Donald L. Ariail
Faculty and Research Publications
Contrary to other forms of outside financing, the announcement of a bank loan agreement prompts a positive and significant market return. Throughout the literature, bank loans are deemed special and unique due to multiple benefits accruing to bank borrowers. The short-term positive market reaction is however inconsistent with the long-term underperformance of borrowing firms (Billet et al., 2006). We find that unlike shareholders, CEOs gain from the bank loan relation over the long-term. Specifically, we find that bank loan agreement elicits a significant increase in total compensation through an increase in non-performance based compensation components such as salary, bonus and …
Institutional Change Versus Resilience: A Study Of An Incorporation Of Independent Directors In Singapore Banks, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Toru Yoshikawa
Institutional Change Versus Resilience: A Study Of An Incorporation Of Independent Directors In Singapore Banks, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Toru Yoshikawa
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We examine how Anglo-American capital market logic penetrated into Singapore where relational logic tends to guide business activities and illustrate how domestic banks reacted to this imported logic in the corporate governance field. We argue that the banks’ ability to accommodate competing logics was enhanced by state agencies’ willingness to modify Anglo-American standards to fit the local context. Given the resulting institutional ambiguities in rules, local banks, while incorporating higher outside representation on their boards, reinterpreted the meaning of independence and emphasized the resource provision role rather than the monitoring function of outside directors. The resultant institutional change has been …
The Influence Of External Auditors, Capital Markets, And Main Banks On Earnings Manipulations: Evidence From Japan, Kazuhiko Kobori, Robert Hutchinson
The Influence Of External Auditors, Capital Markets, And Main Banks On Earnings Manipulations: Evidence From Japan, Kazuhiko Kobori, Robert Hutchinson
College of Business Publications
The present study investigates the influence of main industrial banks, capital markets, and international audit firms on earnings manipulations in Japan using a sample of firms listed on Japanese stock exchanges. A modified Jones model is used to measure earnings management using discretionary accruals as proxy, and the findings suggest that the main industrial banks continue to play a primary role in Japan’s system of corporate governance. However, global capital markets and international accounting standards may be slowly eroding this influence. This may have significant implications for international investors and policy makers as Japan continues through a protracted economic recession.
Perspectives And Obstacles Of The Shareholder Activism Implementation: A Comparative Analysis Of Civil And Common Law Systems, Khurram Raja, Alex Kostyuk
Perspectives And Obstacles Of The Shareholder Activism Implementation: A Comparative Analysis Of Civil And Common Law Systems, Khurram Raja, Alex Kostyuk
All Works
© 2015, Virtus Interpress. All rights reserved. The paper outlines shareholder activism development in common law and civil law countries and identifies features of these legal systems that create preconditions and obstacles for shareholder activism. Our findings show that tendencies of shareholder activism depend on the type of the legal system, but also vary within the countries that share the same legal system. Thus, we conclude that the type of legal system is not the chief determinant of shareholder activism. A comparative analysis of shareholder activism in Germany and Ukraine (civil law countries) and the USA and the UK (common …
The Interaction Effects Of Ceo Power, Social Connections And Incentive Compensation On Firm Value, Gary Caton, Choo Yong, Jeremy Goh, Jinghao Ke, Scott C. Linn
The Interaction Effects Of Ceo Power, Social Connections And Incentive Compensation On Firm Value, Gary Caton, Choo Yong, Jeremy Goh, Jinghao Ke, Scott C. Linn
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We study the relation between company value and the interplay between CEO power, CEO equity incentives and the friendliness of the board of directors. Following Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011), we measure CEO power as the proportion paid to the CEO of the total compensation paid to the top five executives of the firm. We find that strong CEO equity incentives and the presence of a friendly board of directors both individually moderate the negative effect of CEO power on Tobin’s q. Moreover, these variables also work together. We find that firm value tends to increase when equity incentives are …
Rediscovering Corporate Governance In Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr.
Rediscovering Corporate Governance In Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Essay on Lynn LoPucki and Bill Whitford’s corporate reorganization project, written for a symposium honoring Bill Whitford, I begin by very briefly describing its historical antecedents. The project draws on the insights and perspectives of two closely intertwined traditions: the legal realism of 1930s, whose exemplars included William Douglas and other participants in the SEC study; and the law in action movement at the University of Wisconsin. In Section II, I briefly survey the key contributions of the corporate governance project, which punctured the then-conventional wisdom about the treatment of shareholders in bankruptcy, managers’ principal allegiance, and many …
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
All Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …