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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Business
Rational Design Rights Ignorance, David Orozco
Innovation Policy And Friends Of The Court: Intellectual Property Advocacy Before The U.S. Supreme Court, David Orozco, James Conley
Innovation Policy And Friends Of The Court: Intellectual Property Advocacy Before The U.S. Supreme Court, David Orozco, James Conley
David Orozco
No abstract provided.
Economic Consequences Of Legal Origins, Florencio López De Silanes
Economic Consequences Of Legal Origins, Florencio López De Silanes
Florencio López de Silanes
No abstract provided.
El Colegio De Abogados Como Un Cartel: Efectos Económicos Y Sociales De La Restricción De Publicidad De Los Abogados, Óscar Sumar, Julio Avellaneda
El Colegio De Abogados Como Un Cartel: Efectos Económicos Y Sociales De La Restricción De Publicidad De Los Abogados, Óscar Sumar, Julio Avellaneda
Oscar Súmar
No abstract provided.
Privatization In Latin America: What Does The Evidence Say?, Florencio López De Silanes, Alberto Chong
Privatization In Latin America: What Does The Evidence Say?, Florencio López De Silanes, Alberto Chong
Florencio López de Silanes
After decades of poor performance and inefficient operations by state-owned enterprises, governments all over the world earnestly embraced privatization. Thousands of state-owned enterprises have been turned over to the private sector in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and eastern and western Europe. This trend was spurred by the well-documented poor performance and failures of state-owned enterprises and the efficiency improvements after privatization around the world.1 Privatiza-tion efforts have greatly stalled in recent years, however, despite world-wide evidence that points to improved performance, firm restructuring, fiscal benefits, increased output, and quality improvements following privatization.
Investor Protection And Corporate Valuation, Florencio López De Silanes, Rafael La Porta , Andrei Shleifer , Robert Vishny
Investor Protection And Corporate Valuation, Florencio López De Silanes, Rafael La Porta , Andrei Shleifer , Robert Vishny
Florencio López de Silanes
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cashflow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Tunneling, Florencio López De Silanes, Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta , Andrei Shleifer
Tunneling, Florencio López De Silanes, Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta , Andrei Shleifer
Florencio López de Silanes
Tunnelling is defined as the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders. We describe the various forms that tunnelling can take, and examine under what circumstances it is legal. We discuss two important legal principles -- the duty of care and the duty of loyalty -- which courts use to analyze cases involving tunnelling. Several important legal cases from France, Belgium, and Italy illustrate how and why the law accommodates tunnelling in civil law countries, and why certain kinds of tunnelling are less likely to pass legal scrutiny in common law countries.
Agency Problems And Dividend Policies Around The World, Florencio López De Silanes, Robert Vishny , Andrei Shleifer
Agency Problems And Dividend Policies Around The World, Florencio López De Silanes, Robert Vishny , Andrei Shleifer
Florencio López de Silanes
This paper addresses the question of why firms pay dividends, the so-called "dividend puzzle," from the agency perspective. We outline two agency models of dividends. On what we call "the outcomes" model, dividends are the result of effective pressure by minority shareholders rights should be associated with higher dividends. On what we call "the substitutes" model, insiders choose to pay dividends to establish a reputation for a decent treatment of minority shareholders so that firms can raise equity finance in the future. Under this model, stronger minority shareholder rights reduce the need for establishing a reputation, and so should be …
The Benefits Of Privatization: Evidence From Mexico, Florencio López De Silanes, Rafael La Porta
The Benefits Of Privatization: Evidence From Mexico, Florencio López De Silanes, Rafael La Porta
Florencio López de Silanes
Criticisms of privatization have centered around the possibility that the observed higher profitability of privatized companies comes at the expense of the rest of society. In this paper we focus on two of the most likely channels for social losses: (1) increased prices as firms capitalize on the market power; and (2) layoffs and lower wages as firms seek to roll back generous labor contracts. Using data for all 218 non-financial privatizations that took place in Mexico between 1983 and 1991 we find that privatized firms quickly bridge the pre-privatization performance gap with industry-matched control groups. For example, privatization is …
Corporate Ownership Around The World, Florencio López De Silanes, Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer
Corporate Ownership Around The World, Florencio López De Silanes, Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer
Florencio López de Silanes
We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely held corporations is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily …
Law And Finance, Florencio López De Silanes, Rafael La Porta , Andrei Shleifer , Robert Vishny
Law And Finance, Florencio López De Silanes, Rafael La Porta , Andrei Shleifer , Robert Vishny
Florencio López de Silanes
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.