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Full-Text Articles in Business
Political Connection, Founder-Manager And Their Impact On Tunneling In China's Listed Firms, Liangbo Ma, Shiguang Ma, Gary G. Tian
Political Connection, Founder-Manager And Their Impact On Tunneling In China's Listed Firms, Liangbo Ma, Shiguang Ma, Gary G. Tian
Shiguang Ma
Reciprocal relationship, often regarded as mutually beneficial and secure, can actually be destructive and result in inefficiency. We provide evidence of such double-blade by studying the impact of political connection on corporate governance. Private firms in countries where the government controls the allocation of resources have incentives to seek political connections by hiring politicians or ex-politicians as top executives. Such political capital, however, may turn into political constraint when the CEOs fail to perform but use connections to entrench themselves. We take advantage of the unique setting in China to illustrate this argument. We show that politically connected CEOs have …
Executive Compensation, Board Characteristics And Firm Performance In China: The Impact Of Compensation Committee, Yuqing Zhu, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma
Executive Compensation, Board Characteristics And Firm Performance In China: The Impact Of Compensation Committee, Yuqing Zhu, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma
Shiguang Ma
The independent directors of a board can impact CEO payperformancemore effectively if a compensation committeeprovides information and assist them in designing relevantexecutive pay schemes. On the basis of this idea, we developed andtested the hypotheses that Chinese firms with a compensationcommittee have a closer CEO pay link with performance when alarger proportion of independent directors serves on the board. Wefocused primarily on the effect of a compensation committee onCEO pay-performance relation as a consequence of its help for theboard and found that board independence produces a strongerrelationship between executive compensation and firmperformance in Chinese listed firms. This association is more …
Managerial Compensation, Ownership Structure And Firm Performance In China's Listed Firms, Xiaofei Pan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma, Aelee Jun, Qingliang Tang
Managerial Compensation, Ownership Structure And Firm Performance In China's Listed Firms, Xiaofei Pan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma, Aelee Jun, Qingliang Tang
Shiguang Ma
This paper investigates managerial compensation and its relationship with firm performance in China's listed firms. In China, the largest shareholder dominates other shareholders, controls the firm and therefore exercises substantial impacts on manager compensation. After controlling for other firm and industry characteristics, we find that manager remuneration is greater and pay-performance relation is stronger for privately-controlled firms than for state-controlled firms. We also document that state-controlled firms exercise performance-based manager incentive schemes, which is contrary to evidence found in some earlier studies. Our results also indicate that top executives in firms with a foreign ownership are more highly compensated, relative …