Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Business
Ceo Contractual Protection And Debt Contracting, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Alvis K. Lo, Xin Wang
Ceo Contractual Protection And Debt Contracting, Qiang Cheng, Xia Chen, Alvis K. Lo, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
CEO employment agreements and severance pay agreements are prevalent among S&P1500 firms. While prior research has examined their impact on corporate decision from shareholders’ perspective, there is little research on their impact from debtholders’ perspective. We examine the effect on debt contracting of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements. We find that compared with other loans, loans issued by firms with CEO contractual protection contain more financial covenants, particularly performance covenants, are more likely to have performance pricing provisions, and have higher loan spreads. We further find that this effect increases with the …
Ceo Contractual Protection And Managerial Short-Termism, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Alvis K. Lo, Xin Wang
Ceo Contractual Protection And Managerial Short-Termism, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Alvis K. Lo, Xin Wang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect …