Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Business
Family Ownership And Ceo Turnovers, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Zhonglan Dai
Family Ownership And Ceo Turnovers, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Zhonglan Dai
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. We find that family firms managed by CEOs outside the founding family (i.e., professional CEO family firms) have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than family firms managed by family members (i.e., family CEO firms) or non-family firms. These results are robust to alternative performance measures and CEO turnover definitions. Additional analyses indicate that higher family ownership leads to even higher (lower) turnover-performance sensitivity in professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms). These results indicate that, with regard to CEO turnover decisions, better monitoring of CEOs by family …
Are Us Family Firms Subject To Agency Problems? Evidence From Ceo Turnover And Firm Valuation, Xia Chen, Zhonglan Dai
Are Us Family Firms Subject To Agency Problems? Evidence From Ceo Turnover And Firm Valuation, Xia Chen, Zhonglan Dai
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This paper investigates the impact of the founding family's presence in US public firms on the extent of agency problems related to CEO turnover decisions and on firm valuations after poor performance. In particular, we focus on three types of US public firms: family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms (family firms managed by a hired CEO outside the founding family), and non-family firms. We hypothesize that, the agency problem arising from the expropriation of small shareholders by large shareholders in family CEO firms and the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control in non-family firms, lead …