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Full-Text Articles in Business
Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae B. Kim
Managers' Pay Duration And Voluntary Disclosures, Qiang Cheng, Young Jun Cho, Jae B. Kim
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Given the adverse effect on their welfare, managers are reluctant to disclose bad news in a timely fashion. We examine the effect of managers' pay duration on firms' voluntary disclosures of bad news. Pay duration refers to the average period that it takes for managers' annual compensation to vest. We hypothesize and find that pay durations can incentivize managers to provide more bad news earnings forecasts. This result holds after controlling for the endogeneity of pay duration. In addition, we find that the effect of pay duration is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance and with poorer information environments, …
Generalist Versus Specialist Ceos And Acquisitions: Two-Sided Matching And The Impact Of Ceo Characteristics On Firm Outcomes, Guoli Chen, Sterling Huang, Philipp Meyer-Doyle
Generalist Versus Specialist Ceos And Acquisitions: Two-Sided Matching And The Impact Of Ceo Characteristics On Firm Outcomes, Guoli Chen, Sterling Huang, Philipp Meyer-Doyle
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Research Summary: To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm-CEO matching, we deploy a two-sided matching model that identifies the complementarities arising from the CEO-firm match and subsequently account for these complementarities in empirical tests. Applying this approach, we examine how the nature of CEOs' human capital affects the acquisition behavior and performance of firms. We find that generalist CEOs (CEOs with a broader set of knowledge and skills) are more likely to engage in unrelated acquisitions than specialist CEOs (CEOs with a narrower but deeper set of knowledge and skills). We also find that the fit between the nature of …
The Effects Of Tax Avoidance News On Employee Perceptions Of Managers And Firms: Evidence From Glassdoor.Com Ratings, Yoojin Lee, Shaphan Ng, Terry Shevlin, Aruhn Venkat
The Effects Of Tax Avoidance News On Employee Perceptions Of Managers And Firms: Evidence From Glassdoor.Com Ratings, Yoojin Lee, Shaphan Ng, Terry Shevlin, Aruhn Venkat
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine whether employee perceptions of managers and firms fall following tax avoidance news. Using S&P 500 firms and generalized difference-in-differences specifications, we find that tax avoidance news negatively affects employee perceptions of managers and firms. In cross-sectional tests, we find that (1) firms and managers in consumer-facing industries suffer larger employee-related perception changes from tax avoidance news compared to other firms, and (2) well-performing firms and their managers face smaller perception changes than other firms and managers. Overall, our results are consistent with tax avoidance news negatively affecting employee perceptions of managers and firms.