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Agency theory

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Payout Policy, Managerial Perquisites, And Sticky Sg&A Costs, Deborah Smith Sep 2021

Payout Policy, Managerial Perquisites, And Sticky Sg&A Costs, Deborah Smith

Business Faculty Publications

Background

Sticky SG&A costs provide a novel opportunity to investigate whether payout policy serves as a remedy for management overspending on perquisites that are embedded in SG&A expenses. Payout policy, especially under strong governance, may reduce overspending. Another possibility is that management may use sales declines opportunistically to repurchase shares when sales are expected to rebound.

Methods

Regression analysis is used to examine the effect of payout mechanisms (dividends, share repurchases, and combinations thereof) and shareholder rights (EIndex) to determine whether managerial overspending on perquisites is reduced through payout policy.

Results

The results indicate that dividends and share repurchases are …


Does Institutional Ownership Affect Information Sharing With Independent Board Members?, Deborah D. Smith, Heidi H. Meier, Pervaiz Alam May 2019

Does Institutional Ownership Affect Information Sharing With Independent Board Members?, Deborah D. Smith, Heidi H. Meier, Pervaiz Alam

Business Faculty Publications

Research Question This is an investigation of board independence to determine whether management shares information with the board, or withholds information to retain autonomy. A key contribution is to examine the interaction of institutional ownership with the main test variables to determine whether institutional governance influences the information environment as board independence is increased. Research Findings The results show that information asymmetry decreases internally and increases externally as board independence increases, yet institutional ownership appears to moderate or reverse this relationship. The following variables are used to explain why managers of firms are likely to have more information than outsiders: …