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University of Wollongong

Social and Behavioral Sciences

2009

Firm

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Business

Executive Compensation, Board Characteristics And Firm Performance In China: The Impact Of Compensation Committee, Yuqing Zhu, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma Jan 2009

Executive Compensation, Board Characteristics And Firm Performance In China: The Impact Of Compensation Committee, Yuqing Zhu, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma

Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive)

The independent directors of a board can impact CEO payperformancemore effectively if a compensation committeeprovides information and assist them in designing relevantexecutive pay schemes. On the basis of this idea, we developed andtested the hypotheses that Chinese firms with a compensationcommittee have a closer CEO pay link with performance when alarger proportion of independent directors serves on the board. Wefocused primarily on the effect of a compensation committee onCEO pay-performance relation as a consequence of its help for theboard and found that board independence produces a strongerrelationship between executive compensation and firmperformance in Chinese listed firms. This association is more …


Board Composition, Board Activity And Ownership Concentration, The Impact On Firm Performance, Shiguang Ma, Gary Tian Jan 2009

Board Composition, Board Activity And Ownership Concentration, The Impact On Firm Performance, Shiguang Ma, Gary Tian

Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive)

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest …


Managerial Ownership, Capital Structure And Firm Value, Wenjuan Ruan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma Jan 2009

Managerial Ownership, Capital Structure And Firm Value, Wenjuan Ruan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma

Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive)

This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S&P 500 firm in 2005. The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interest, and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in …


Managerial Compensation, Ownership Structure And Firm Performance In China's Listed Firms, Xiaofei Pan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma, Aelee Jun, Qingliang Tang Jan 2009

Managerial Compensation, Ownership Structure And Firm Performance In China's Listed Firms, Xiaofei Pan, Gary G. Tian, Shiguang Ma, Aelee Jun, Qingliang Tang

Faculty of Commerce - Papers (Archive)

This paper investigates managerial compensation and its relationship with firm performance in China's listed firms. In China, the largest shareholder dominates other shareholders, controls the firm and therefore exercises substantial impacts on manager compensation. After controlling for other firm and industry characteristics, we find that manager remuneration is greater and pay-performance relation is stronger for privately-controlled firms than for state-controlled firms. We also document that state-controlled firms exercise performance-based manager incentive schemes, which is contrary to evidence found in some earlier studies. Our results also indicate that top executives in firms with a foreign ownership are more highly compensated, relative …