Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Business Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

University of Windsor

2009

Corporate governance

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Business

The Effect Of Compensation Committee Quality On The Association Between Ceo Cash Compensation And Accounting Performance, Jerry Sun, Steven Cahan Jan 2009

The Effect Of Compensation Committee Quality On The Association Between Ceo Cash Compensation And Accounting Performance, Jerry Sun, Steven Cahan

Odette School of Business Publications

We examine the effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings and the moderating effects of growth opportunities and earnings status.

Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of 812 US firms, we find that CEO cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings when firms have high compensation committee quality. We also find that the positive effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings is less for high growth firms or loss-making firms.Theoretical

Implications: We contribute to the agency-based research on CEO compensation by: 1) directly …


What Happens To Ceo Compensation Following Turnover And Succession?, Eahab Elsaid, Wallace N. Davidson Iii Jan 2009

What Happens To Ceo Compensation Following Turnover And Succession?, Eahab Elsaid, Wallace N. Davidson Iii

Odette School of Business Publications

When boards hire CEOs, the board and successor CEO have an opportunity to redesign the predecessor's compensation contract. The CEO's relative bargaining power will influence the outcome of compensation negotiations. Analyzing 508 successions, we find that total compensation of successor CEOs increases by 69% over their predecessor, but the structure of successor compensation is heavily influenced by the predecessors’ contracts. When the board's bargaining power is large, successors have a greater proportion of pay-at-risk and smaller proportion of salary. When the CEO's bargaining power is large, there is a smaller proportion of pay-at-risk and relatively greater proportion of salary.