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Full-Text Articles in Business
How Do Board Ties Affect The Adoption Of New Practices? The Effects Of Managerial Interest And Hierarchical Power, Toru Yoshikawa, Jung Wook Shim, Chang Hyun Kim, Anja Tuschke
How Do Board Ties Affect The Adoption Of New Practices? The Effects Of Managerial Interest And Hierarchical Power, Toru Yoshikawa, Jung Wook Shim, Chang Hyun Kim, Anja Tuschke
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Research Question/Issues: Most extant literature implicitly equates obtaining information through board interlocks to acting on the information. We investigate triggers that help to translate the information into action. In addition to exposure to the information by board interlocks, we suggest that the self-interest of the individuals who create these ties and hierarchical power of interlinked firms determines the likelihood of taking actions of adopting new practices. Research Findings/Insights: Using the action of adopting two distinctive governance practices, stock option pays or board reform, we find that sent ties and received ties affect the adoption decisions differently. Whereas sent ties reflect …
Corporate Governance: Avoid The Groupthink Pitfall, Themin Suwardy
Corporate Governance: Avoid The Groupthink Pitfall, Themin Suwardy
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Consensus due to similar personal backgrounds, lack of diversity in views and failure to see things from others’ perspective can lead to bad decisions.
A One-Size-Fits-All Approach To Corporate Governance Codes And Compliance By Smaller Listed Firms: An Examination Of Companies Listed In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen
A One-Size-Fits-All Approach To Corporate Governance Codes And Compliance By Smaller Listed Firms: An Examination Of Companies Listed In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
This article examines the impact of a one-size-fits-all corporate governance code on smaller listed firms, which should have fewer resources to hire more qualified independent directors for their boards and board committees. After examining data from a sample of companies listed in Hong Kong and Singapore, we find some limited support for these resources-based arguments. While smaller firms do not necessarily have a lower proportion of board members who are independent directors, some evidence suggests that smaller firms do pay less to independent directors and that these directors have to serve on multiple board committees. Although many larger firms also …
Public Governance, Corporate Governance, And Firm Innovation: An Examination Of State-Owned Enterprises, Nan Jia, Kenneth G. Huang, Cyndi Man Zhang
Public Governance, Corporate Governance, And Firm Innovation: An Examination Of State-Owned Enterprises, Nan Jia, Kenneth G. Huang, Cyndi Man Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We examine how corporate and public governance shape an important type moral hazard in innovation which is that agents pursuing the quantity of innovation at the expense of the novelty. We theorize that both better corporate governance tools that regulate agents (including better alignment of agents’ private incentives and stronger monitoring), and higher-quality public governance that regulates the principals of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reduce this moral hazard. Furthermore, we argue that higher-quality political governance enhances the functioning of better corporate governance tools in further reducing this moral hazard in innovation, thus creating interdependence. We test our theory in the context …
Not Clawing The Hand That Feeds You: The Case Of Co-Opted Boards And Clawbacks, Sterling Huang, Chee Yeow Lim, Jeffrey Ng
Not Clawing The Hand That Feeds You: The Case Of Co-Opted Boards And Clawbacks, Sterling Huang, Chee Yeow Lim, Jeffrey Ng
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We examine how board co-option, defined as the fraction of the board comprising directors appointed after the CEO assumed office, is related to clawback adoption. We find that co-opted boards have a lower probability of adopting clawback provisions. Further, the negative association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least one co-opted member is on the compensation committee and when there is a higher likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered. Finally, we find that board co-option is an important mechanism through which longer-tenured CEOs reduce the likelihood of clawback adoption.
The Geography Of Csr, David K. Ding, Christo Ferreira, Udomsak Wongchoti
The Geography Of Csr, David K. Ding, Christo Ferreira, Udomsak Wongchoti
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We regress socio-economic indicators against firm level CSR scores using a sample of over 26,000 firm year observations from 1991 through 2009. We find that a firm's CSR profile is linked to the socio-economic conditions of the firm's geographic headquarters (HQ) location. The study documents that the legal, cultural, economic, and demographic differences across geography significantly explain the variation in CSR means between metropolitan statistical areas, states, and regions. We also find that the relation between CSR and firm performance is conditional on socio-economic factors, which highlight the endogeneity concerns inherent in CSR studies. Lastly, we show that firms that …