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Director Tenure Diversity And Board Monitoring Effectiveness, Na Li, Aida Sijamic Wahid
Director Tenure Diversity And Board Monitoring Effectiveness, Na Li, Aida Sijamic Wahid
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This study examines the impact of director tenure diversity on board effectiveness. We find that tenure-diverse boards exhibit significantly higher CEO performance-turnover sensitivity and that firms with tenure-diverse audit committees are less likely to experience accounting restatements. Furthermore, we document that tenure-diverse compensation committees also award less excess compensation and are less likely to overcompensate. Even though tenure-diverse boards seem to exhibit superior monitoring performance, there is limited evidence that their firms exhibit superior financial performance. The findings suggest that recent calls for board renewal, to the extent that it would increase tenure diversity rather than just decrease average board …
Director Tenure Diversity And Board Monitoring Effectiveness, Na Li, Aida Sijamic Wahid
Director Tenure Diversity And Board Monitoring Effectiveness, Na Li, Aida Sijamic Wahid
Research Collection School Of Economics
This study examines the impact of director tenure diversity on board effectiveness. We find that tenure-diverse boards exhibit significantly higher CEO performance-turnover sensitivity and that firms with tenure-diverse audit committees are less likely to experience accounting restatements. Furthermore, we document that tenure-diverse compensation committees also award less excess compensation and are less likely to overcompensate. Even though tenure-diverse boards seem to exhibit superior monitoring performance, there is limited evidence that their firms exhibit superior financial performance. The findings suggest that recent calls for board renewal, to the extent that it would increase tenure diversity rather than just decrease average board …
Is Corporate Social Responsibility An Agency Problem?, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog
Is Corporate Social Responsibility An Agency Problem?, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This chapter examines whether CSR investments occur mostly in firms with severe agency problems, which suggests that CSR is an agency issue. We demonstrate that this is not the case: CSR investments and performance are higher when dividends are high, leverage is high, cash flows and cash holdings are low, and when there is a high managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity. All these variables combined represent managerial discipline in terms of corporate investing. We also document that better legal protection of shareholder rights is positively related to CSR performance. This implies that when shareholders are more powerful relative to the management, the …