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Full-Text Articles in Business

Japanese Corporate Governance: Structural Change And Financial Performance, Asli M. Colpan, Toru Yoshikawa, Takashi Hikino, Hiroaki Miyoshi Dec 2007

Japanese Corporate Governance: Structural Change And Financial Performance, Asli M. Colpan, Toru Yoshikawa, Takashi Hikino, Hiroaki Miyoshi

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper analyzes institutional and legal changes related to corporate governance and their impact on financial performance in Japan since the second half of the 1990s. We attempt to address two issues systematically: (1) how much the governance reforms of Japanese firms transformed the conventional system of alliance capitalism and managerial control; and (2) what economic outcomes those governance changes have yielded. As the Commercial Code and other legal and institutional frameworks were revised, Japanese firms experienced shifts in terms of stock ownership, corporate control and managerial organizations. Our empirical results show that the influence of new ownership composition and …


Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li Nov 2007

Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the …


Corporate Governance Reform As Institutional Innovation: The Case Of Japan, Toru Yoshikawa, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Jean Mcguire Nov 2007

Corporate Governance Reform As Institutional Innovation: The Case Of Japan, Toru Yoshikawa, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Jean Mcguire

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

To address the convergence-divergence debate in corporate governance, we conduct a multiple-case, multiple-level study to analyze the diffusion of governance innovation in Japan. We argue that Japanese systems of corporate governance neither fully converge to, nor completely diverge from, the Anglo-American model. Rather, Sony-the pioneer of corporate governance reforms-and its followers selectively adopted features from this model, decoupled them from the original context, and tailored them to fit to their own situations to generate governance innovation. However, we find that the spread of innovation across firms and institutional levels is far from linear and straightforward, and that other well-regarded firms …


Bonding To The Improved Disclosure Environment In The Us: Firms Listing Choices And Their Capital Market Consequences, Ole-Kristian Hope, Tony Kang, Yoonseok Zang Jun 2007

Bonding To The Improved Disclosure Environment In The Us: Firms Listing Choices And Their Capital Market Consequences, Ole-Kristian Hope, Tony Kang, Yoonseok Zang

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

This paper examines whether the current reporting and disclosure requirements for foreign registrants in the United States affect foreign firms' decisions to list on a U.S. exchange. We find that while firms from a weak disclosure environment are more likely to cross-list and either trade over-the-counter or be placed privately among institutional investors, they are less likely to list on an exchange in which firms are required to comply with U.S. GAAP. This is consistent with the idea that the decrease in the potential private control benefits accruing to managers discourages them from listing on an organized exchange. We further …