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Full-Text Articles in Business
Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton
Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market failures.
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Comments On The Rggi Market Design, Peter Cramton
Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton
Possible Design For A Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Comments On Doc Notice Of Preliminary Results Of Countervailing Duty Review, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Comments On Doc Notice Of Preliminary Results Of Countervailing Duty Review, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Upset Pricing In Auction Markets: An Overview, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Upset Pricing In Auction Markets: An Overview, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
An Analysis Of Auction Volume And Market Competition For The Coastal Forest Regions In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
An Analysis Of Auction Volume And Market Competition For The Coastal Forest Regions In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Reserve Prices, Stumpage Fees, And Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Reserve Prices, Stumpage Fees, And Efficiency, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Setting The Upset Price In British Columbia Timber Auctions, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Auctioning Timber To Maximize Revenues In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
A Comparison Of Equation-Based And Parity Pricing Of Stumpage Fees For British Columbia Timber Under Long-Term Tenures, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Testing For Anti-Competitive Bidding In Auction Markets, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Auction-Based Timber Pricing And Complementary Market Reforms In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey, Allan Ingraham
Peter Cramton
US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.
Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr
Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How And Why To Auction Not Grandfather, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr
Peter Cramton
An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution), …
A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton
A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
The Distributional Effects Of Carbon Regulation, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr
The Distributional Effects Of Carbon Regulation, Peter Cramton, Suzi Kerr
Peter Cramton
We examine the distributional effects of carbon regulation. An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents.