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Full-Text Articles in Business
Beyond The Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: Towards A Plurality Of Corporate Governance Logics, Jordan Otten
Beyond The Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: Towards A Plurality Of Corporate Governance Logics, Jordan Otten
Jordan Otten
The dichotomous worlds hypothesis holds that corporate governance systems worldwide are either based on the Anglo-American shareholder model or the Eurasian stakeholder model. We suggest a more fine-grained classification, based on five corporate governance logics –socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which all parties involved in economic productive activities structure their material interdependencies and provide meaning to the social reality of corporate life. These logics are discovered through a content analysis of the corporate governance reform codes of 38 countries.
Relational Investing And Agency Theory, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres
Relational Investing And Agency Theory, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres
Peter Cramton
This Article analyzes how, and when, corporate governance could be improved by utilizing "relational investing." The term relational investing is just coming into vogue and there does not yet seem to be a consensus on what it means. Although the term has been trumpeted on the cover of Business Week, before the Conference on Relational Investing at Columbia University, relatively little legal writing had been published on the subject. For the purposes of this Article, we define relational investing to encompass commitments to buy and hold significant blocks of a corporation's stock. And it is particularly important that the relational …
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Peter Cramton
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a …