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Full-Text Articles in Business

Vickrey Auctions With Reserve Pricing, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Apr 2004

Vickrey Auctions With Reserve Pricing, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders’ reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.


Auctioning Many Divisible Goods, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Apr 2004

Auctioning Many Divisible Goods, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them.


Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey Feb 2004

Competitive Auction Markets In British Columbia, Peter Cramton, Susan Athey

Peter Cramton

US-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute, On behalf of British Columbia Ministry of Forests.


What Do The Ibbottson Historical Studies Really Prove About Firm Size, Risk And Return?, Michael Sack Elmaleh Jan 2004

What Do The Ibbottson Historical Studies Really Prove About Firm Size, Risk And Return?, Michael Sack Elmaleh

Michael Sack Elmaleh

I deny that the Ibbottson historical studies prove that small and medium caps outperform large caps because they are more risky. First, I question whether covariance measures are necessarily a good proxy for risk. The higher levels of volatility associated with small and medium cap versus large cap may be a statistical artifact: the greater number of transactions associated with large caps as compared to small caps may account for this difference. Secondly, higher returns on small and medium caps may be a function of less efficient information distribution for these securities as compared to large caps. Finally, can we …


Bank Lending And The Effectiveness Of Monetary Policy Under A Revised Basel Accord, Kevin T. Jacques, David Schirm Jan 2004

Bank Lending And The Effectiveness Of Monetary Policy Under A Revised Basel Accord, Kevin T. Jacques, David Schirm

Kevin T Jacques

No abstract provided.


Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton Jan 2004

Competitive Bidding Behavior In Uniform-Price Auction Markets, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. This incentive to bid above marginal cost is not the result of coordinated action among the bidders. Rather, each bidder is independently selecting its bid to maximize profits based on its estimate of the residual demand curve it faces. The supplier bids a price for its energy capacity to optimize its marginal tradeoff between higher prices and lower quantities. Price response from either demand or other suppliers prevents the supplier from raising its bid too …