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Full-Text Articles in Business
Using Auctions To Divest Generation Assets, Peter Cramton, Lisa J. Cameron, Robert Wilson
Using Auctions To Divest Generation Assets, Peter Cramton, Lisa J. Cameron, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
In most states, ratepayers will compensate utilities for their stranded costs. As a result, these costs must be measured as accurately as possible, in a manner that is easily understood by all concerned parties. We describe the options for measuring stranded costs and argue that a simultaneous ascending auction is the best approach.
Package Bidding For Spectrum Licenses, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Package Bidding For Spectrum Licenses, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
The FCC was an innovator in adopting the rules of the simultaneous ascending-price auction for its sales of spectrum licenses. While these rules have performed well in the auctions conducted so far (and would perform even better with the design improvements suggested in our first report), there are two inherent limitations in any design that seeks to assign and price the licenses individually. First, such designs create strategic incentives for bidders interested in multiple licenses that are substitutes to reduce their demands for some of the licenses in order to reduce the final prices of the others; this is the …
Auction Design Enhancements For Non-Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Auction Design Enhancements For Non-Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, John Mcmillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction for individual licenses. This report summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the auction where important improvement can be achieved within the basic rules structure. These are restricting collusion among bidders and reducing the time taken to …
Reply Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton
Reply Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
For Antigone and Devco.
Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton
Statement On The Effect Of Nextwave’S Participation In The C-Block Auction On Antigone And Devco, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
For Antigone and Devco.
Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk, And Bank Capital: A Simultaneous Equations Approach, Kevin T. Jacques, Peter Nigro
Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk, And Bank Capital: A Simultaneous Equations Approach, Kevin T. Jacques, Peter Nigro
Kevin T Jacques
This paper examines the impact the risk-based capital standards had on bank capital and portfolio risk during the first year the risk-based standards were in effect.
The Fcc Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, Peter Cramton
The Fcc Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
Synergies In Wireless Telephony: Evidence From The Broadband Pcs Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel, R. Preston Mcafee, John Mcmillan
Synergies In Wireless Telephony: Evidence From The Broadband Pcs Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel, R. Preston Mcafee, John Mcmillan
Peter Cramton
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest-losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.