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Ceo Compensation And Risk-Taking At Financial Firms: Evidence From U.S. Federal Loan Assistance, Amar Gande, Swami Kalpathy
Ceo Compensation And Risk-Taking At Financial Firms: Evidence From U.S. Federal Loan Assistance, Amar Gande, Swami Kalpathy
Amar Gande
We examine whether risk-taking among the largest financial firms in the U.S. is related to CEO equity incentives before the 2008 financial crisis. Using data on U.S. Federal Reserve emergency loans provided to these firms, we find that the amount of emergency loans and total days the loans are outstanding are increasing in pre-crisis CEO risk-taking incentives – “vega”. Our results are robust to accounting for endogeneity in CEO equity incentives and selection of financial firms into emergency loan programs. We also rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a bank’s funding base, bank complexity, CEO overconfidence, …
Why Do U.S. Securities Laws Matter To Non-U.S. Firms? Evidence From Private Class-Action Lawsuits, Amar Gande, Darius P. Miller
Why Do U.S. Securities Laws Matter To Non-U.S. Firms? Evidence From Private Class-Action Lawsuits, Amar Gande, Darius P. Miller
Amar Gande
A continuing controversy is whether U.S. securities laws are enforced against foreign firms, since public enforcement actions by the SEC are infrequent and often result in insignificant penalties. We examine private enforcement actions of U.S. securities laws and find that 269 securities class-action lawsuits were filed against foreign firms from 1996 to 2008. We document the severity of the penalties imposed on foreign firms and show that while firms paid a total of $9 billion to settle lawsuits brought against them, the monetary penalties levied by the market are even larger. During the three-day period surrounding the lawsuit filing date, …