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Advertising Collusion In Retail Markets, Kyle Bagwell, Gea M. Lee
Advertising Collusion In Retail Markets, Kyle Bagwell, Gea M. Lee
Research Collection School Of Economics
We analyze non-price advertising by retail firms, when the firms are privately informed about their respective costs of production. In a static advertising game, an advertising equilibrium exists in which lower-cost firms select higher advertising levels. In this equilibrium, informed consumers rationally employ an advertising search rule in which they buy from the highest- advertising firm, since lower-cost firms also select lower prices. In a repeated advertising game, colluding firms face a tradeoff: the use of advertising can promote productive efficiency but only if sufficient current or future advertising expenses are incurred. At one extreme, if firms pool at zero …