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Full-Text Articles in Business
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Lubomir P. Litov
The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors. This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …
From Governance To Political Economy: Insights From A Study Of Relations Between Corporations And Workers, Harry W. Arthurs, Claire Mumme
From Governance To Political Economy: Insights From A Study Of Relations Between Corporations And Workers, Harry W. Arthurs, Claire Mumme
Harry Arthurs
This study explores four postwar attempts to re-imagine the role of workers within the corporation and especially their relation to the processes of corporate governance. Employees have been variously conceptualized as "citizens at work," whose rights of association, speech, assembly, and due process can be secured through collective bargaining; as "stakeholders," whose interests are entitled to consideration analogous to those of corporate shareholders; as "human capital," worth preserving and enhancing through enlightened employment policies and practices; and as "investors"-actual holders of corporate equity through pension funds and other vehicles. Despite the descriptive power and normative appeal of these approaches, each …
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors. This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …
On The Nature Of Corporations, Lynn A. Stout
On The Nature Of Corporations, Lynn A. Stout
Lynn A. Stout
Legal experts traditionally distinguish corporations from unincorporated business forms by focusing on corporate characteristics like limited shareholder liability, centralized management, perpetual life, and free transferability of shares. While such approaches have value, this essay argues that the nature of the corporation can be better understood by focusing on a fifth, often-overlooked, characteristic of corporations: their capacity to "lock in" equity investors' initial capital contributions by making it far more difficult for those investors to subsequently withdraw assets from the firm. Like a tar pit, a corporation is much easier for equity investors to get into, than to get out of. …
The Interaction Among Multiple Governance Mechanisms At Young, Newly Public Firms, Tammy K. Berry, L. Paige Fields, Michael S. Wilkins
The Interaction Among Multiple Governance Mechanisms At Young, Newly Public Firms, Tammy K. Berry, L. Paige Fields, Michael S. Wilkins
Michael S Wilkins
We focus on the relations among inside ownership, board composition, unaffiliated block ownership, and compensation structure for a sample of firms following their IPOs. Specifically, we follow firms for up to eleven years after their IPOs and examine the full sample and subsamples of firms that survive, are acquired, or that file for bankruptcy during the sample period. We find that as CEO ownership declines, board independence, board seats held by venture capitalists, and unaffiliated block ownership increase. Our findings suggest that as inside ownership decreases alternative governance mechanisms evolve to help mitigate the resulting increase in agency costs. Interestingly, …