Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Business
Corporate Governance Of Innovation In Singapore Chinese Family Business, Geok Chwee Ong
Corporate Governance Of Innovation In Singapore Chinese Family Business, Geok Chwee Ong
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)
Despite the large number of research publications on innovation management matters, there is still a gap in the understanding of effective innovation governance at corporate levels. The mechanisms that drive effective governance at firm level to ensure the “alignment of goals, allocation of resources and assignment of decision-making authority for innovation across the company, and with external parties” (Deschamps, 2013) remain unclear. Given the importance of family firms in Asia (and beyond), there is an urgent need to examine those family factors that influence the effectiveness of corporate governance of innovation in Asian enterprise. Against this background, this study attempts …
Cybersecurity Oversight Liability, Benjamin P. Edwards
Cybersecurity Oversight Liability, Benjamin P. Edwards
Georgia State University Law Review
A changing cybersecurity environment now poses a significant corporate-governance challenge. Although some cybersecurity data breaches may be inevitable, courts now increasingly consider when a corporation’s officers and directors may be held liable on theories that they acted in bad faith and failed to adequately oversee the corporation’s affairs. This short essay reviews recent derivative decisions and encourages corporate boards to recognize that in an environment filled with increasing threats, a reasonable response will require devoting real resources and attention to cybersecurity issues.
When Less Is More: The Benefit Of Limits On Executive Pay, Peter Cebon, Benjamin Hermalin
When Less Is More: The Benefit Of Limits On Executive Pay, Peter Cebon, Benjamin Hermalin
Peter Cebon
We derive conditions under which limits on executive compensation can enhance efficiency and benefit shareholders (but not executives). Having their hands tied in the future allows a board of directors to credibly enter into relational contracts with executives that are more efficient than performance-contingent contracts. This has implications for the ideal composition of the board. The analysis also offers insights into the political economy of executive-compensation reform.