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Full-Text Articles in Business
Shareholder Influence Over Director Nomination Via Proxy Access: Implications For Agency Conflict And Stakeholder Value, Joanna Tochman Campbell, T. Colin Campbell, David G. Sirmon, Leonard Bierman, Chris S. Tuggle
Shareholder Influence Over Director Nomination Via Proxy Access: Implications For Agency Conflict And Stakeholder Value, Joanna Tochman Campbell, T. Colin Campbell, David G. Sirmon, Leonard Bierman, Chris S. Tuggle
Department of Management: Faculty Publications
Corporate governance research indicates that corporate boards of directors may be overly beholden to management, which can be detrimental to firm value creation. Drawing upon agency theory and the governance law literature, we examine the effects of a new SEC rule designed to lessen managerial power by increasing large, long-term shareholders’ influence in the director nomination process. We predict and find support for a positive overall market reaction to the rule’s announcement as well as a greater reaction for firms with characteristics that suggest compromised board independence or greater CEO control. Moreover, we examine the implications of greater shareholder voice …
The Effects Of The Environment And Corporate Governance On Illegal Cartel Activity, David Kunsch
The Effects Of The Environment And Corporate Governance On Illegal Cartel Activity, David Kunsch
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
Illegal corporate activity, including the price fixing activity of two or more firms through cartels, costs the global economy billions of dollars a year, yet its causes are neither well studied nor well understood in organizational literature. This thesis explores possible external and internal antecedents of illegal cartel activity through the management lenses of resource dependency theory and agency theory and the criminological theory of anomie in the examination of the research question “Why do corporations engage in illegal activity?” I posit that illegal international cartel activity is influenced by the environment in which the organization finds itself, moderated by …
Shareholder Eugenics In The Public Corporation, Edward B. Rock
Shareholder Eugenics In The Public Corporation, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
In a world of active, empowered shareholders, the match between shareholders and public corporations can potentially affect firm value. This article examines the extent to which publicly held corporations can shape their shareholder base. Two sorts of approaches are available: direct/recruitment strategies; and shaping or socialization strategies. Direct/recruitment strategies through which “good” shareholders are attracted to the firm include: going public; targeted placement of shares; traditional investor relations; the exploitation of clientele effects; and de-recruitment. “Shaping” or “socialization” strategies in which shareholders of a “bad” or unknown type are transformed into shareholders of the “good” type include: choice of domicile; …