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- Irreversibility (3)
- Uncertainty (3)
- Biodiversity (2)
- Quasi-option value (2)
- Value of information (2)
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- Collective decision making (1)
- Committee (1)
- Dominant strategy (1)
- Ex post incentive compatibility (1)
- Housing Price (1)
- Land Price (1)
- Land Sale Auctions (1)
- Multi-unit auctions (1)
- Product Differentiation (1)
- Project selection (1)
- Public policy (1)
- Quasi-option values (1)
- Simple majority rule (1)
- Specialization (1)
- Strategic Sequential Bidding (1)
- Uncertain dichotomous choice (1)
- Value of Information (1)
Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Business
Strategic Sequential Bidding For Government Land Auction Sales – Evidence From Singapore, Sumit Agarwal, Jing Li, Ernie Teo, Alan Cheong
Strategic Sequential Bidding For Government Land Auction Sales – Evidence From Singapore, Sumit Agarwal, Jing Li, Ernie Teo, Alan Cheong
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper studies the extent to which equilibrium auction prices are pushed up sequentially due to strategic bidding behaviors in government land auction sales. Using a unique dataset that covers the universe of tendering prices submitted by all developers for all residential land auction sales in Singapore, we find that a tenderer’s bids are significantly higher where there was a previous land parcel sold within two years and located within four kilometers. The elevated price margin decreases with time and geographic distance. Tracking sequential bids submitted by same developers over time, we find that the incumbent winner of a previous …
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry And Dixit-Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry And Dixit-Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We extend the Arrow–Fisher–Hanemann–Henry (AFHH) and Dixit–Pindyck (DP) option values to a game situation. By reinterpreting the AFHH option value as a change in the surplus from conservation because of the prospect of future information, we deal with a conceptual difficulty associated with the AFHH option value in the presence of strategic interactions. We then introduce the DP option value into a game situation. We show that the equivalence between the expected value of information and the DP option value in the standard model does not hold under strategic interactions.
Is Specialization Desirable In Committee Decision Making?, Ruth Ben-Yashar, Winston T. H. Koh, Shmuel Nitzan
Is Specialization Desirable In Committee Decision Making?, Ruth Ben-Yashar, Winston T. H. Koh, Shmuel Nitzan
Research Collection School Of Economics
Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers. Specialization (in the context of project or public policy selection) means that the decision of each committee member is based on a narrow area, which typically results in the acquirement and use of relatively high expertise in that area. When the committee members’ expertise is already determined, specialization only means that the decision of each committee member is based solely on his/her relatively high …
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry And Dixit-Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry And Dixit-Pindyck Option Values Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We extend the Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry (AFHH) and Dixit-Pindyck (DP) option values to game situations. By reinterpreting the AFHH option value as a change in the surplus from conservation because of the prospect of future information, we deal with the conceptual difficulty associated with the AFHH option value in the presence of strategic interactions. We then introduce the DP option value into a game situation. We show that the equivalence between the expected value of information and the DP option value in the standard model does not hold under strategic interactions.
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced inefficiency may arise in a game situation and that under certain assumptions inefficiency can be eliminated by sending asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints. Our model is potentially applicable to …
Incentive Compatibility In Multi-Unit Auctions, Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Incentive Compatibility In Multi-Unit Auctions, Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models and ex post incentive compatibility in models with interdependent values. NDMU is the following requirement: if changing one buyer’s type, while keeping everyone else’s types the same, changes this buyer’s allocation then the new allocation must be relatively more attractive (or relatively less unattractive) to this buyer. We also establish a price characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.