Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Business
Legal Risk And Insider Trading, Marcin Kacperczyk, Emiliano Sebastian Pagnotta
Legal Risk And Insider Trading, Marcin Kacperczyk, Emiliano Sebastian Pagnotta
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? We address this question with hand-collected data from 530 SEC (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) investigations. Using two plausibly exogenous shocks to expected penalties, we show that insiders trade less aggressively and earlier and concentrate on tips of greater value when facing a higher risk. The results match the predictions of a model where an insider internalizes the impact of trades on prices and the likelihood of prosecution and anticipates penalties in proportion to trade profits. Our findings lend support to the effectiveness of U.S. regulations' deterrence and the long-standing hypothesis that insider …
Textual Analysis And Machine Leaning: Crack Unstructured Data In Finance And Accounting, Li Guo, Feng Shi, Jun Tu
Textual Analysis And Machine Leaning: Crack Unstructured Data In Finance And Accounting, Li Guo, Feng Shi, Jun Tu
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
In finance and accounting, relative to quantitative methods traditionally used, textual analysis becomes popular recently despite of its substantially less precise manner. In an overview of the literature, we describe various methods used in textual analysis, especially machine learning. By comparing their classification performance, we find that neural network outperforms many other machine learning techniques in classifying news category. Moreover, we highlight that there are many challenges left for future development of textual analysis, such as identifying multiple objects within one single document.
Advertising Collusion In Retail Markets, Kyle Bagwell, Gea M. Lee
Advertising Collusion In Retail Markets, Kyle Bagwell, Gea M. Lee
Research Collection School Of Economics
We analyze non-price advertising by retail firms, when the firms are privately informed about their respective costs of production. In a static advertising game, an advertising equilibrium exists in which lower-cost firms select higher advertising levels. In this equilibrium, informed consumers rationally employ an advertising search rule in which they buy from the highest- advertising firm, since lower-cost firms also select lower prices. In a repeated advertising game, colluding firms face a tradeoff: the use of advertising can promote productive efficiency but only if sufficient current or future advertising expenses are incurred. At one extreme, if firms pool at zero …