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Full-Text Articles in Business
Local Competition, Multimarket Contact, And Product Quality: Evidence From Internet Service Provision, Kyle Wilson
Local Competition, Multimarket Contact, And Product Quality: Evidence From Internet Service Provision, Kyle Wilson
Pomona Faculty Publications and Research
I investigate the effect of competition on quality in the internet service provision industry: I examine both local competition within markets and multimarket contact among firms across markets. This industry offers an ideal setting, as quality is both objective and measurable. I use data from speedtest.net from 2008 to 2014 to estimate a reduced-form model of the effects of local competition and multimarket contact on realized consumer download speeds. I find that increased multimarket contact leads to decreased download speeds, which is consistent with the mutual forbearance hypothesis. I also find that duopolies lead to faster download speeds than do …
Aclp - Comments To Ntia Re Digital Equity Act Grants Programs - May 2023, New York Law School
Aclp - Comments To Ntia Re Digital Equity Act Grants Programs - May 2023, New York Law School
Reports and Resources
No abstract provided.
Aclp - Broadband Planning Tool Kit - October 2022, New York Law School
Aclp - Broadband Planning Tool Kit - October 2022, New York Law School
Reports and Resources
This Tool Kit provides state and local policymakers with a range of resources and analyses for use during broadband planning. The Tool Kit focuses on the array of grant and other funding opportunities available to states and localities as a result of the Infrastructure Investment & Jobs Act, as well as other pandemic-era stimulus programs. However, the Tool Kit is also useful for broadband planning outside of these specific funding programs. Indeed, the Tool Kit offers foundational planning resources that can be used now and in the future by officials, ISPs, and other stakeholders in the broadband space.
Outcomes Of Self-Directed Work Groups In Telecommunications Services, Rosemary Batt
Outcomes Of Self-Directed Work Groups In Telecommunications Services, Rosemary Batt
Rosemary Batt
[Excerpt] The purpose of my presentation is to consider whether the use of self-directed teams enhances competitiveness in services. In the context of heightened competition brought about by deregulation and the internationalization of service markets, do "team-based" work systems produce higher quality service and customer satisfaction? Do workers benefit as well? Should unions as well as management support this innovation? If so, under what conditions and why? This presentation complements that of the other panelists in this session in important ways. First, while Verma provides an overview of the array of workplace innovations being introduced in telecommunications firms (from joint …
The Wires Go To War: The U.S. Experiment With Government Ownership Of The Telephone System During World War I, Michael A. Janson, Christopher S. Yoo
The Wires Go To War: The U.S. Experiment With Government Ownership Of The Telephone System During World War I, Michael A. Janson, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
One of the most distinctive characteristics of the U.S. telephone system is that it has always been privately owned, in stark contrast to the pattern of government ownership followed by virtually every other nation. What is not widely known is how close the United States came to falling in line with the rest of the world. For the one-year period following July 31, 1918, the exigencies of World War I led the federal government to take over the U.S. telephone system. A close examination of this episode sheds new light into a number of current policy issues. The history confirms …
The Impact Of Business Elite Cohesion On Public Policy Alternatives : A Comparative Examination Of Banking And Telecommunication Legislation In The 1930s And 1990s, Geoffrey Lee Wood
The Impact Of Business Elite Cohesion On Public Policy Alternatives : A Comparative Examination Of Banking And Telecommunication Legislation In The 1930s And 1990s, Geoffrey Lee Wood
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
ABSTRACT
Slides: Impacts Of Energy Deficits In Cooking, Illumination, Water, Sanitation, And Motive Power, Paul S. Chinowsky
Slides: Impacts Of Energy Deficits In Cooking, Illumination, Water, Sanitation, And Motive Power, Paul S. Chinowsky
2012 Energy Justice Conference and Technology Exposition (September 17-18)
Presenter: Dr. Paul Chinowsky, Director, Mortenson Center in Engineering for Developing Communities; Professor, University of Colorado
25 slides
Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1
Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1
Peter Cramton
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.
The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak
The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak
GEORGE S FORD
In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) began to grant incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) pricing flexibility on special access services in some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) when specific evidence of competitive alternatives is present. The propriety of that deregulatory move by the FCC has been criticized by the purchasers of such services ever since. Proponents of special access price regulation rely on three central arguments to support a retreat to strict price regulation: (1) the market(s) for special access and similar services is unduly concentrated; (2) rates of return on special access services, computed using FCC ARMIS data, are …
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.
Toward A Unified Theory Of Access To Local Telephone Systems, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
Toward A Unified Theory Of Access To Local Telephone Systems, Daniel F. Spulber, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
One of the most distinctive developments in telecommunications policy over the past few decades has been the increasingly broad array of access requirements regulatory authorities have imposed on local telephone providers. In so doing, policymakers did not fully consider whether the justifications for regulating telecommunications remained valid. They also allowed each access regime to be governed by its own pricing methodology and set access prices in a way that treated each network component as if it existed in isolation. The result was a regulatory regime that was internally inconsistent, vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage, and unable to capture the interactions among …
The Enduring Lessons Of The Breakup Of At&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, Christopher S. Yoo
The Enduring Lessons Of The Breakup Of At&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
On April 18-19, 2008, the University of Pennsylvania Law School hosted a landmark conference on “The Enduring Lessons of the Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective.” This conference was the first major event for Penn’s newly established Center for Technology, Innovation, and Competition, a research institute committed to promoting basic research into foundational frameworks that will shape the way policymakers think about technology-related issues in the future. The breakup of AT&T represents an ideal starting point for reexamining the major themes of telecommunications policy that have emerged over the past quarter century. The conference featured a keynote address by …
A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton
A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This note briefly reviews the auction.
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day
Peter Cramton
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe, and proposed for use in the FAA’s landing-slot auctions in the United States. Specifically, we compute a unique point “in the core” that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties, adding to the perceived “fairness” of this payment rule. Further, we discuss the many benefits of this combinatorial auction paradigm.
A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton
A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were assigned. This note briefly reviews the auction.
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market failures.
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
Peter Cramton
This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier’s participation in two simultaneously conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of incumbents. This paper also estimates what prices would have been in the open auction had incumbents been excluded from bidding in the closed. It is found that an incumbent’s participation in the closed auction through a front, Alaska Native, enabled it to win more licenses at lower prices in FCC Auction 35. In contrast, non-incumbents won fewer …
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
This paper is provided in connection with the 2007 Telecommunications Symposium – Voice, Video and Broadband: The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its Impact on Consumers, sponsored by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“the Division”). Our focus is on the state of competition in the wireless sector. Maintaining a competitive wireless sector is particularly critical if, as the Division’s agenda indicates, wireless services are to function as a competitive alternative to wireline technologies. Strengthening competition is especially important now after recent mergers that consolidated the wireless industry into a few dominant firms (two to four depending on …
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson
Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.
Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
A common misconception is that an open access provision on a sliver of the 700 MHz spectrum would reduce auction revenues. In fact, the open access, wholesale, and bidding credit provisions put forth by Frontline Wireless, will motivate new entry, enhance competition in the auction, and raise revenues.
Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding credits, and the open access plan. We disagree with these criticisms and argue that given the current market structure, such rules are likely to improve welfare and auction revenues. We are submitting this report to provide sound economic analysis of these claims.
Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
We comment on the service and auction rules discussed in the Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC 07-72, 27 April 2007. We recommend that the FCC designate one license for a wholesale operation that provides open access nationwide on nondiscriminatory terms. This is necessary to enable entry of new businesses offering wireless services in retail markets. It also enables local operators to offer roaming at competitive prices. The new license accords with the Commission’s policy to encourage competition, and recognizes the benefits to consumers from low prices and expanded services.
Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Ex Parte Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Ex parte communication on various auction rules for the AWS auction.
Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Declaration on various auction rules for the AWS auction. On behalf of T-Mobile US.
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Reply declaration on various auction rules for the AWS auction. On behalf of T-Mobile US.
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom
Peter Cramton
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …