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Portfolio and Security Analysis

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

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Corporate governance

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Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Business

Identifying Ineffective Monitors From Securities Class Action Lawsuits, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang Oct 2018

Identifying Ineffective Monitors From Securities Class Action Lawsuits, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We identify “ineffective” institutional monitors based on the prevalence of occurrences of securities class-action lawsuits in their overall portfolio. We find that firms with a higher representation of such institutional investors among the firms’ large shareholders have a greater likelihood of future litigation and experience more negative market reactions upon such litigation filings. These firms exhibit other unfavorable governance outcomes including poorer acquisitions and lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We find suggestive evidence that ineffective monitoring may be a result of higher operational risk.


Adverse Selection And Corporate Governance, Charlie Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Vasan Siraprapasiri Jun 2011

Adverse Selection And Corporate Governance, Charlie Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Vasan Siraprapasiri

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse …