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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Business
Urban Consolidation Center Or Peer-To-Peer Platform? The Solution To Urban Last-Mile Delivery, Qiyuan Deng, Xin Fang, Yun Fong Lim
Urban Consolidation Center Or Peer-To-Peer Platform? The Solution To Urban Last-Mile Delivery, Qiyuan Deng, Xin Fang, Yun Fong Lim
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The growing population in cities and booming e-commerce activities create huge demand for urban last-mile delivery, exerting intense pressure on the cities' well-being. To keep congestion and pollution under control, a consolidator can operate an urban consolidation center (UCC) to bundle shipments from multiple carriers before the last-mile delivery. Alternatively, the consolidator can operate a peer-to-peer platform for the carriers to share delivery capacity. We provide guidance for the consolidator to choose between these two business models by comparative analysis. We capture the interactions between the consolidator and carriers using a game-theoretical framework. Under each business model, the consolidator first …
Contracting Mechanisms For Stable Sourcing Networks, Jennifer K. Ryan, Lusheng Shao, Daewon Sun
Contracting Mechanisms For Stable Sourcing Networks, Jennifer K. Ryan, Lusheng Shao, Daewon Sun
Department of Supply Chain Management and Analytics: Faculty and Staff Publications
Problem definition: We study profit allocation for a sourcing network, in which a buyer sources froma set of differentiated suppliers with limited capacity under uncertain demand for the final product. Whereas the buyer takes the lead in forming the sourcing network and designing the contract mechanism, due to their substantial bargaining power, the suppliers take the lead in determining the terms of the contract. Academic/practical relevance: We identify contracting mechanisms that will ensure the stability of the sourcing network in the long term, where a stable sourcing network requires an effective profitallocation scheme that motivates all members to …
Urban Consolidation Center Or Peer-To-Peer Platform? The Solution To Urban Last-Mile Delivery, Qiyuan Deng, Xin Fang, Yun Fong Lim
Urban Consolidation Center Or Peer-To-Peer Platform? The Solution To Urban Last-Mile Delivery, Qiyuan Deng, Xin Fang, Yun Fong Lim
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Booming e-commerce activities further increase this demand, exerting intense pressure on the cities' well-being. To build a city with congestion and pollution under control, a consolidator can operate an urban consolidation center (UCC) to bundle shipments from multiple carriers before the last-mile delivery. Alternatively, the consolidator can operate a peer-to-peer platform for the carriers to share their delivery capacity. Our objective is to compare the performance of these two business models. Under each business model, we study the interactions between a consolidator and multiple carriers using a two-period game-theoretical model. In each period, the consolidator first chooses a delivery fee …
Blood Supply Chain Networks In Healthcare: Game Theory Models And Numerical Case Studies, Pritha Dutta
Blood Supply Chain Networks In Healthcare: Game Theory Models And Numerical Case Studies, Pritha Dutta
Doctoral Dissertations
A crucial component of every healthcare system is the safe and steady supply of the life-saving product, blood. In order to meet the demand for blood consistently, it is imperative to maintain a robust supply chain. The blood banking industry in the United States, faced with emerging challenges, which include, an increase in operating costs, rise in competition among blood centers, insufficient reimbursement from payers such as insurance companies and government programs, in addition to inherent challenges such as donor motivation, seasonal shortages, perishability, is trying to adapt to the changing dynamics to sustain itself economically. The altruistic nature of …
Installed Base Management Versus Selling In Monopolistic And Competitive Environments, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Andreas Robotis, Wassenhove Luk N. V. Van
Installed Base Management Versus Selling In Monopolistic And Competitive Environments, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Andreas Robotis, Wassenhove Luk N. V. Van
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper compares the policy of selling a product to that of installed base management, in which the manufacturer leases the product to consumers, and bundles repair and maintenance services along with the product. We compare the two policies in a monopolistic setting when a firm uses either one of the policies, and when both policies are used by a single firm. We then compare the policies under competition first when two firms use identical products, and when two firms use vertically differentiated products. Our findings indicate that the selling option dominates the installed base option in a monopolistic environment, …
Strategic Signaling And New Technologically Superior Product Introduction: A Game-Theoretic Model With Simulation, Madjid Tavana, Debora Di Caprio, Francisco J. Santos-Arteaga
Strategic Signaling And New Technologically Superior Product Introduction: A Game-Theoretic Model With Simulation, Madjid Tavana, Debora Di Caprio, Francisco J. Santos-Arteaga
Business Systems and Analytics Faculty Work
User acceptance of technology is essential to determine its success. The current paper incorporates the main properties of the technology acceptance models (TAMs) developed by management scholars into a pre-commitment signaling duopolistic framework, where two competing firms must decide the level of technological improvement of the products being introduced. As a result, the corresponding equilibria of the duopolistic technological games will be determined by demand-based factors, providing a novel approach and complementing the current supply-based economic and operational research models developed in the literature. The proposed model will be simulated numerically to illustrate the strategic optimality of the update process …
Contracts To Promote Optimal Use Of Optional Diagnostic Tests In Cancer Treatment, Salar Ghamat, Gregory S. Zaric, Hubert Pun
Contracts To Promote Optimal Use Of Optional Diagnostic Tests In Cancer Treatment, Salar Ghamat, Gregory S. Zaric, Hubert Pun
Business Publications
In this study, we examine performance-based payment contracts to promote the optimal use of an optional diagnostic test for newly diagnosed cancer patients. Our work is inspired by three trends: tremendous increases in the cost of new, advanced cancer drugs; development of new diagnostic tests to allow physicians to tailor treatment to patients; and changes in healthcare funding models that reward quality care. We model the interaction between two parties—a healthcare payer and an oncologist, in which the oncologist has private information about patients’ characteristics (adverse selection) and the payer does not know whether the oncologist takes the optimal course …
Network Game Theory Models Of Services And Quality Competition With Applications To Future Internet Architectures And Supply Chains, Sara Saberi
Doctoral Dissertations
The Internet has transformed the way in which we conduct business and perform economic and financial transactions. One key challenge of the Internet is the inefficiency of the mechanisms by which technology is deployed and the business and economic models surrounding these processes (Wolf et al. (2014)). Equilibrium models for the Internet generally assume basic economic relationships. However, in new paradigms for the Internet and in supply chain networks, price is not the only factor; quality of service (QoS) is also of increasing importance. Supply chains networks, which give us the means to manufacture products and deliver them to points …
Consignment Contracts With Revenue Sharing For A Capacitated Retailer And Multiple Manufacturers, Yun Fong Lim, Yunzeng Wang, Yue Wu
Consignment Contracts With Revenue Sharing For A Capacitated Retailer And Multiple Manufacturers, Yun Fong Lim, Yunzeng Wang, Yue Wu
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We consider a retailer with limited storage capacity selling n independent products. Each product is produced by a distinct manufacturer, who is offered a consignment contract with revenue sharing by the retailer. The retailer first sets a common revenue share for all products, and each manufacturer then determines the retail price and production quantity for his product. Under certain conditions on price elasticities and cost fractions, we find a unique optimal revenue share for all products. Surprisingly, it is optimal for the retailer not to charge any storage fee in many situations even if she is allowed to do so. …
Combating Strategic Counterfeiters In Licit And Illicit Supply Chains, Soo-Haeng Cho, Xin Fang, Sridhar Tayur
Combating Strategic Counterfeiters In Licit And Illicit Supply Chains, Soo-Haeng Cho, Xin Fang, Sridhar Tayur
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Counterfeit goods are becoming more sophisticated, from shoes to infant milk powder to aircraft parts, creating problems for consumers, firms, and governments. By comparing two types of counterfeiters—deceptive, so infiltrating a licit (but complicit) distributor, or nondeceptive in an illicit channel—we provide insights into the impact of anticounterfeiting strategies on a brand-name company, a counterfeiter, and consumers. Our analysis highlights that the effectiveness of these strategies depends critically on whether a brand-name company faces a nondeceptive or deceptive counterfeiter. For example, by improving quality, the brand-name company can improve her expected profit against a nondeceptive counterfeiter when the counterfeiter steals …
Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis Of The Selling And Pay-Per-Use Mechanisms, Sridhar Balasubramanian, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vish V. Krishnan
Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis Of The Selling And Pay-Per-Use Mechanisms, Sridhar Balasubramanian, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vish V. Krishnan
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods. These mechanisms are selling, where up-front payment allows unrestricted use, and pay-per-use, where payments are tailored to use. We analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay-per-use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known "ticking meter" effect. We demonstrate that pay-per-use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low. In a duopoly, one firm uses selling and the other uses pay-per-use. Here, in contrast to the monopoly, selling yields higher profits than pay-per-use. We demonstrate that, …
Coordinating A Supply Chain With A Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model Under Price Competition, Jennifer K. Ryan, Daewon Sun, Xuying Zhao
Coordinating A Supply Chain With A Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model Under Price Competition, Jennifer K. Ryan, Daewon Sun, Xuying Zhao
Department of Supply Chain Management and Analytics: Faculty and Staff Publications
We consider a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells a single product to end-users through both a traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned direct online channel. We adopt a commonly used linear demand substitution model in which the mean demand in each channel is a function of the prices in each channel.We model each channel as a news vendor problem, with price and order quantity as decision variables. In addition, the manufacturer must choose the wholesale price to charge to the independent retailer. We analyze the optimal decisions for each channel and prove the existence of a …
Consolidating Or Non-Consolidating Queues: A Game Theoretic Queuing Model With Holding Costs, Kwan Eng Wee, Ananth Iyer
Consolidating Or Non-Consolidating Queues: A Game Theoretic Queuing Model With Holding Costs, Kwan Eng Wee, Ananth Iyer
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We consider a two-server queueing system in which the servers choose their service rate based on the demand and holding cost allocation scheme offered by the demand generating entity. We provide an optimal holding cost allocation scheme that leads to the maximum possible service rate for each of a pooled and a split system. Our results suggest that careful allocation of holding costs can create incentives that enable minimum turnaround times using a common queue.
Managing Supply Uncertainty With An Information Market, Zhiling Guo, Fang Fang, Andrew B. Whinston
Managing Supply Uncertainty With An Information Market, Zhiling Guo, Fang Fang, Andrew B. Whinston
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
We propose a market-based information aggregation mechanism to manage the supply side uncertainty in the supply chain. In our analytical model, a simple supply chain consists of a group of retailers who order a homogeneous product from two suppliers. The two suppliers differ in their ability to fulfill orders – one always delivers orders and the other fulfills orders probabilistically. We model the supply chain decisions as a Stackelberg game where the supplier who has uncertain reliability decides a wholesale price before the retailers who independently receive signals about the supplier’s reliability determine their sourcing strategies. We then propose an …