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Full-Text Articles in Business
Consignment Contracts With Revenue Sharing For A Capacitated Retailer And Multiple Manufacturers, Yun Fong Lim, Yunzeng Wang, Yue Wu
Consignment Contracts With Revenue Sharing For A Capacitated Retailer And Multiple Manufacturers, Yun Fong Lim, Yunzeng Wang, Yue Wu
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We consider a retailer with limited storage capacity selling n independent products. Each product is produced by a distinct manufacturer, who is offered a consignment contract with revenue sharing by the retailer. The retailer first sets a common revenue share for all products, and each manufacturer then determines the retail price and production quantity for his product. Under certain conditions on price elasticities and cost fractions, we find a unique optimal revenue share for all products. Surprisingly, it is optimal for the retailer not to charge any storage fee in many situations even if she is allowed to do so. …
Combating Strategic Counterfeiters In Licit And Illicit Supply Chains, Soo-Haeng Cho, Xin Fang, Sridhar Tayur
Combating Strategic Counterfeiters In Licit And Illicit Supply Chains, Soo-Haeng Cho, Xin Fang, Sridhar Tayur
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Counterfeit goods are becoming more sophisticated, from shoes to infant milk powder to aircraft parts, creating problems for consumers, firms, and governments. By comparing two types of counterfeiters—deceptive, so infiltrating a licit (but complicit) distributor, or nondeceptive in an illicit channel—we provide insights into the impact of anticounterfeiting strategies on a brand-name company, a counterfeiter, and consumers. Our analysis highlights that the effectiveness of these strategies depends critically on whether a brand-name company faces a nondeceptive or deceptive counterfeiter. For example, by improving quality, the brand-name company can improve her expected profit against a nondeceptive counterfeiter when the counterfeiter steals …
Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis Of The Selling And Pay-Per-Use Mechanisms, Sridhar Balasubramanian, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vish V. Krishnan
Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis Of The Selling And Pay-Per-Use Mechanisms, Sridhar Balasubramanian, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vish V. Krishnan
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods. These mechanisms are selling, where up-front payment allows unrestricted use, and pay-per-use, where payments are tailored to use. We analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay-per-use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known "ticking meter" effect. We demonstrate that pay-per-use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low. In a duopoly, one firm uses selling and the other uses pay-per-use. Here, in contrast to the monopoly, selling yields higher profits than pay-per-use. We demonstrate that, …