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Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis Of The Selling And Pay-Per-Use Mechanisms, Sridhar Balasubramanian, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Vish V. Krishnan

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods. These mechanisms are selling, where up-front payment allows unrestricted use, and pay-per-use, where payments are tailored to use. We analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay-per-use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known "ticking meter" effect. We demonstrate that pay-per-use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low. In a duopoly, one firm uses selling and the other uses pay-per-use. Here, in contrast to the monopoly, selling yields higher profits than pay-per-use. We demonstrate that, …