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Comparison Of Dependence And Punitive Forms Of Power, Edward J. Lawler, Samuel B. Bacharach
Comparison Of Dependence And Punitive Forms Of Power, Edward J. Lawler, Samuel B. Bacharach
Edward J Lawler
This paper deals with the impact of power on tactical action in conflict. The theory and research is organized around two conceptual distinctions: one between power based on dependence versus punitive capability, and the other between relative power (i.e., power difference) and "total power" in a relationship (i.e., across actors). The paper will argue that these distinctions are important on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, they are important to explicate the connection between conceptions of power that stress the coercive foundation of power (Bierstedt 1950; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma 1973) and those that treat power as dependence (Bacharach & …
Bargaining And Influence In Conflict Situations, Edward J. Lawler, Rebecca Ford
Bargaining And Influence In Conflict Situations, Edward J. Lawler, Rebecca Ford
Edward J Lawler
[Excerpt] This chapter examines bargaining as an influence process through which actors attempt to resolve a social conflict. Conflict occurs when two or more interdependent actors have incompatible preferences and perceive or anticipate resistance from each other (Blalock 1989; Kriesberg 1982). Bargaining is a basic form of goal-directed action that involves both intentions to influence and efforts by each actor to carry out these intentions. Tactics are verbal and/or nonverbal actions designed to maneuver oneself into a favorable position vis-a-vis another or to reach some accommodation. Our treatment of bargaining subsumes the concept of "negotiation" (see Morley and Stephenson 1977). …
Power And Tactics In Bargaining, Samuel B. Bacharach, Edward J. Lawler
Power And Tactics In Bargaining, Samuel B. Bacharach, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This paper develops and tests an analytical framework for analyzing the selection of tactics in bargaining. Using a variant of power-dependence theory, the authors propose that bargainers will use different dimensions of dependence, such as the availability of alternative outcomes from other sources and the value of the outcomes at stake, to select among different tactics. To test this model, the authors conducted two simulation experiments that portrayed an employee-employer conflict over a pay raise, manipulating four dimensions of dependence: employee's outcome alternatives, employee's outcome value, employer's outcome alternatives, and employer's outcome value. Within this context, respondents estimated the likelihood …
From Revolutionary Coalitions To Bilateral Deterrence: A Nonzero-Sum Approach To Social Power, Edward J. Lawler
From Revolutionary Coalitions To Bilateral Deterrence: A Nonzero-Sum Approach To Social Power, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This chapter reviews a program of work investigating how social power, defined as a structurally based capability, affects the tactics chosen in a conflict. A nonzero-sum approach to power stipulates that the total amount of power in a relationship can have effects distinct from those of relative power or power difference. This assumption is grounded in Emerson's power dependence theory and reminiscent of Tannenbaum's concept of control. The basic ideas are that (1) higher total power in a relationship has an integrative effect on that relationship, resulting in more conciliatory and less hostile responses to conflict; and (2) larger power …