Business Commons^™

The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.

This paper is an effort to assist courts …

Ip Basics: Seeking Cost-Effective Patents, Thomas G. Field Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarship

This discussion briefly explores the range of intellectual property options in view of the nature of inventions and their market value, particularly for entrepreneurs. Specific strategies for controlling ever-increasing patent costs in the face of market uncertainty. It does not recommend that inventors prosecute patent applications themselves, lest they get much less than they pay for.

Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, Robin C. Feldman, Mark A. Lemley

Robin C Feldman