Business Commons^™

Intangible Investments And The Pricing Of Corporate Sga Expenses, Rongbing Huang, Gim S. Seow, Joe S. Shangguan

Faculty Articles

This study examined whether the market fully prices the reported Selling, General, and Administrative (SGA) expenses when this item includes an intangible investment component. For a sample of intangible investment-intensive firms, we showed that their SGA expenses benefit future operating performances. Evidence suggests some degree of market inefficiency in the pricing of SGA expenses and the intangible investment component. Furthermore, the financial analysts do not appear to appreciate fully the future benefits of the component in their earnings forecasts. Finally, the pertinent disclosures in firms’ annual reports are so inadequate as to attenuate the market mispricing, suggesting a significant room …

Listings From The Emerging Economies: An Opportunity For Reputable Stock Exchanges, Nicholas Tay, Reza Olati

Finance

We provide current evidence to show that the numbers of sponsored depositary receipts created and cross‐listed have increased by more than two‐fold over the last decade and a substantial proportion of this growth came from the emerging and developing economies. We argue that the needs of this clientele and the inadequacies of existing legal and financial system create an opportunity for reputable stock exchanges to play the role of an information and reputation intermediary and in so doing allow exchanges to leverage on their reputation capital to compete more effectively for the growing business from the emerging and developing economies. …

Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott

All Faculty Scholarship

Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance.

Using the …