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Full-Text Articles in Business
Algorithmic Transparency, Jian Sun
Algorithmic Transparency, Jian Sun
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
I study the optimal algorithmic disclosure in a lending market where lenders use a predictive algorithm to mitigate adverse selection. The predictive algorithm is unobservable to borrowers and uses a manipulable borrower feature as input. A regulator maximizes market efficiency by disclosing information about the statistical properties of variables embedded in the predictive algorithm to borrowers. Under the optimal disclosure policy, the posterior belief consists of two disjoint regions in which the borrower feature is more relevant and less relevant in predicting borrower quality, respectively. The optimal disclosure policy differentiates posterior lending market equilibria by the equilibrium data manipulation levels. …
The Information In Asset Fire Sales, Sheng Huang, Matthew C. Ringgenberg, Zhe Zhang
The Information In Asset Fire Sales, Sheng Huang, Matthew C. Ringgenberg, Zhe Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Duplicate record, see https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5894/. Asset prices remain depressed for several years following mutual fund fire sales. We show that price pressure from fire sales is partly due to asymmetric information which leads to an adverse selection problem for arbitrageurs. After a flow shock, fund managers do not scale down their portfolio, rather, they choose to sell a subset of low-quality stocks that subsequently underperform. In other words, fund managers have selling skill. Our findings suggest an explanation for the tendency of asset prices to remain depressed following fire sales: information asymmetries make it difficult for arbitrageurs to disentangle pure …
Institutional Trading Frictions, Chiraphol New Chiyachantana, Pankaj K. Jain
Institutional Trading Frictions, Chiraphol New Chiyachantana, Pankaj K. Jain
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We propose and empirically examine a comprehensive measure of institutional trading frictions to include the dimensions of price impact, quantity of execution, return dynamics, speed of execution or order splitting, and trading commissions. Our empirical analysis reveals that various hidden components of institutional trading frictions such as adverse selection and clean-up costs are persistent and could add significantly to previously measured directly observable components of transaction costs. Our simultaneous system of equations accounts for the endogeniety in institutional order aggressiveness based on potentially superior information as well as order splitting strategies in the implementation stage to reduce transaction costs. Order …
Adverse Selection And Corporate Governance, Charlie Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Vasan Siraprapasiri
Adverse Selection And Corporate Governance, Charlie Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Vasan Siraprapasiri
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse …
Institutional Trading Frictions, Chiraphol New Chiyachantana, Pankaj K. Jain
Institutional Trading Frictions, Chiraphol New Chiyachantana, Pankaj K. Jain
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We propose and empirically examine a comprehensive measure of institutional trading frictions to include the dimensions of price impact, quantity of execution, return dynamics, speed of execution or order splitting, and trading commissions. Our empirical analysis reveals that various hidden components of institutional trading frictions such as adverse selection and clean-up costs are persistent and could add significantly to previously measured directly observable components of transaction costs. Our simultaneous system of equations accounts for the endogeniety in institutional order aggressiveness based on potentially superior information as well as order splitting strategies in the implementation stage to reduce transaction costs. Order …