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Full-Text Articles in Business
Governance And Post-Repurchase Performance, Gary Caton, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Scott Linn
Governance And Post-Repurchase Performance, Gary Caton, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Scott Linn
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater flexibility than do those based on cash dividends. We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly governed companies outperform weakly governed companies after announcing share repurchase programs. Our findings include positive associations between strong governance and both post-announcement adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns. The results are robust to sample selection bias, different sample criteria, governance measurement, and various control variables. In addition, governance strength is associated with larger post-announcement changes in CEO incentive compensation and merger and acquisition activity, both of which we argue are consistent with …
Do Government Linked Companies Hold More Cash?, Chenxi Liu, Kian Leong Nelson Yap, Sili Zhou
Do Government Linked Companies Hold More Cash?, Chenxi Liu, Kian Leong Nelson Yap, Sili Zhou
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
In this paper, we investigate the cash holings of government linked corporations (GLCs) in Singapore, with different levels of Temasek Holdings ownership. We find evidence that Temasek owned public firms hold on average substantially more cash than otherwise similar public firms listed on SGX. This result is robust to different measures of Temasek ownership. We also show that when GLCs have excess cash, they do not spend it on capital expenditure, acquisition, dividends or share repurchase. Instead, they hoard these excess cash leading to an accumulation of cash. In addition, we show that Temasek firms are on average more profitable, …
Governance Matter: Morningstar Stewardship Grades And Mutual Fund Performance, Jerry X. Cao, Aurobindo Ghosh, Jeremy Goh, Wee Seng Ng
Governance Matter: Morningstar Stewardship Grades And Mutual Fund Performance, Jerry X. Cao, Aurobindo Ghosh, Jeremy Goh, Wee Seng Ng
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Mutual fund investors have the arduous task of disentangling luck from ability of mutual fund managers’ performance. In this paper we investigate the role of mutual fund corporate governance (measured by Morningstar Stewardship grade) in mutual fund performance. We propose an objective data-driven corporate governance score based on principal components of Morningstar Stewardship Grades. Furthermore, we establish corporate governance scores have Granger Causality on long-term risk-adjusted returns. The findings suggest that corporate governance grades of mutual funds carry information content beyond the usual star rating measures for predicting long-term mutual fund performance and provide an effective tool for selecting funds.
Role Of Inside Directors In Mitigating Negative Effects Of Outside Directors’ Busyness, Syed Mainuddin Kamal
Role Of Inside Directors In Mitigating Negative Effects Of Outside Directors’ Busyness, Syed Mainuddin Kamal
Doctoral Dissertations
In this study, I investigate the effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm performance, and how the presence of a certified inside director (CID) on the board alters the busyness effect. Busy outside directors are over-stretched to provide adequate monitoring. Certified inside directors (CIDs), inside directors holding a directorship at an unaffiliated firm, have director labor market incentives to focus on their own firm’s performance and share firm-specific information to outside directors for effective monitoring. I find that the negative effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm performance is mitigated when a firm’s board includes a certified inside director (CID). …