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Full-Text Articles in Business

Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer Aug 2011

Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Overvaluation may motivate a firm to use its stock to acquire a target whose stock is not as overpriced (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). Though hypothetically desirable, these acquisitions in practice create little, if any, value for acquirer shareholders. Two factors often impede value creation: payment of a large premium to the target and lack of economic synergies in the acquisition. We find that overvaluationdriven stock acquirers suffer worse operating performance and lower long-run stock returns than control firms that are in the same industry, similarly overvalued at the same time, have similar size and Tobin’s q, but have not pursued …


Firm Structure And Corporate Cash Holdings, Venkat Subramaniam, Tony Tang, Heng Yue, Xin Zhou Jun 2011

Firm Structure And Corporate Cash Holdings, Venkat Subramaniam, Tony Tang, Heng Yue, Xin Zhou

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

We analyze whether the organizational structure of firms (i.e., whether a firm is diversified or focused) affects their cash holdings. Using Compustat firm level and segment-level data, we find that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than their focused counterparts. Our results are robust to industry adjustments at the segment level and to different factors previously found to be important determinants of cash holdings. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and additional robustness tests we are able to attribute the lower cash holdings among diversified firms to complementary growth opportunities across the different segments of these firms and the availability of active internal …