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Segment Disaggregation And Equity-Based Pay Contracts, Young Jun Cho, Hojun Seo
Segment Disaggregation And Equity-Based Pay Contracts, Young Jun Cho, Hojun Seo
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We study the role of segment disaggregation in equity-based pay contracts in diversified firms. Disaggregated segment disclosures can improve the observability of managerial actions in internal capital markets and thus increase implicit incentives for managers to allocate resources as desired by shareholders, substituting for explicit incentives provided to CEOs. We use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 as an identification strategy and find that firms affected by this segment reporting mandate significantly decreased the provision of equity-based incentives in the post-adoption period, especially for firms with higher operating volatilities. This effect is also more pronounced for …
Firm Structure And Corporate Cash Holdings, Venkat Subramaniam, Tony Tang, Heng Yue, Xin Zhou
Firm Structure And Corporate Cash Holdings, Venkat Subramaniam, Tony Tang, Heng Yue, Xin Zhou
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We analyze whether the organizational structure of firms (i.e., whether a firm is diversified or focused) affects their cash holdings. Using Compustat firm level and segment-level data, we find that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than their focused counterparts. Our results are robust to industry adjustments at the segment level and to different factors previously found to be important determinants of cash holdings. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and additional robustness tests we are able to attribute the lower cash holdings among diversified firms to complementary growth opportunities across the different segments of these firms and the availability of active internal …
Accounting Conservatism And Managerial Incentives, Young Koan Kwon
Accounting Conservatism And Managerial Incentives, Young Koan Kwon
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
There are two sources of agency costs under moral hazard: (1) distortions in incentive contracts and (2) implementation of suboptimal decisions. In the accounting literature, the relation between conservative accounting and agency costs of type (1) has received considerable attention (cf. Watts 2002). However, little appears to be known about the effects of accounting conservatism on agency costs of type (2) or trade-offs between agency costs of types (1) and (2). The purpose of this study is to examine this void. In a principal-agent setting in which the principal motivates the agent to expend effort using accounting earnings, this study …