Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Business Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Corporate Finance

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Operating performance

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Business

Governance And Post-Repurchase Performance, Gary Caton, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Scott Linn Aug 2016

Governance And Post-Repurchase Performance, Gary Caton, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Scott Linn

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater flexibility than do those based on cash dividends. We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly governed companies outperform weakly governed companies after announcing share repurchase programs. Our findings include positive associations between strong governance and both post-announcement adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns. The results are robust to sample selection bias, different sample criteria, governance measurement, and various control variables. In addition, governance strength is associated with larger post-announcement changes in CEO incentive compensation and merger and acquisition activity, both of which we argue are consistent with …


Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer Jul 2013

Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.


Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer Aug 2011

Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Overvaluation may motivate a firm to use its stock to acquire a target whose stock is not as overpriced (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). Though hypothetically desirable, these acquisitions in practice create little, if any, value for acquirer shareholders. Two factors often impede value creation: payment of a large premium to the target and lack of economic synergies in the acquisition. We find that overvaluationdriven stock acquirers suffer worse operating performance and lower long-run stock returns than control firms that are in the same industry, similarly overvalued at the same time, have similar size and Tobin’s q, but have not pursued …


Overinvestment And The Operating Performance Of Seo Firms, Fangjian Fu Mar 2010

Overinvestment And The Operating Performance Of Seo Firms, Fangjian Fu

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Prior studies have documented that firms' operating performance deteriorates following seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). This paper proposes and empirically tests the hypothesis that the poor performance is caused by managers' overinvestment. I show that, subsequent to the offering, SEO firms tend to invest more heavily than non-issuing control firms that are in the same industry and have enough financial slack and similar amounts of investment opportunities. More importantly, I find a negative relation between post-issue investment and operating performance, controlling for investment opportunities and pre-issue performance. The evidence supports an overinvestment interpretation as it stands in contrast to the prediction …