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Full-Text Articles in Business
Seasoned Equity Offerings And Corporate Financial Management, Michael J. Barclay, Fangjian Fu, Clifford W. Smith
Seasoned Equity Offerings And Corporate Financial Management, Michael J. Barclay, Fangjian Fu, Clifford W. Smith
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We assume executives managing corporate financial policy consider the firm's current and target leverage, investment plans, anticipated cash flows, and consequences of alternative sequences of financing transactions, operating within efficient markets. Our analysis yields time-series and cross-sectional predictions for management of investment spending and leverage; use of maturity, priority, and convertibility covenants; and management of dividends, share repurchases, cash balances, and credit lines. Our evidence from 8608 SEOs covering 1970–2015 is consistent with implications of our theory, helps to resolve an array of issues in corporate finance, and offers a step toward a more unified analysis of rational corporate financial …
How Capital Structure Influences Diversification Performance: A Transaction Cost Perspective, Jonathan O'Brien, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Andrew Delios
How Capital Structure Influences Diversification Performance: A Transaction Cost Perspective, Jonathan O'Brien, Parthiban David, Toru Yoshikawa, Andrew Delios
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification, but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are …
Leverage Change, Debt Overhang, And Stock Prices, Jie Cai, Zhe Zhang
Leverage Change, Debt Overhang, And Stock Prices, Jie Cai, Zhe Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm's leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage ratios, higher likelihood of default, and face more severe financial constraints. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.
Leverage Change, Debt Overhang, And Stock Prices, Jie Cai, Zhe Zhang
Leverage Change, Debt Overhang, And Stock Prices, Jie Cai, Zhe Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm’s leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms with a greater likelihood of debt overhang. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.
The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa
The Implications Of Debt Heterogeneity For R&D Investment And Firm Performance, Parthiban David, Jonathan P. O'Brien, Toru Yoshikawa
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
An assumption in prior research is that debt is homogeneous and provides inappropriate governance for R&D investments. We argue that debt is heterogeneous: although transactional debt does indeed impose strict contractual constraints that provide inappropriate governance for R&D investments, relational debt has very different characteristics that provide more appropriate governance. Using a sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms that align their debt structures with their R&D investments perform better than those that are misaligned. Furthermore, firms tend to align their debt structure with R&D investments, but only after deregulation permits relatively free access to various types of debt.