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Ceo Power, Corporate Social Responsibility, And Firm Value: A Test Of Agency Theory, Zhichuan Li
Ceo Power, Corporate Social Responsibility, And Firm Value: A Test Of Agency Theory, Zhichuan Li
Business Publications
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether firms with powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) tend to invest (more) in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities as the over-investment hypothesis based on classical agency theory predicts.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper tests an alternative hypothesis that if CSR investment is indeed an agency cost like the over-investment hypothesis suggests, then those activities may destroy firm value.
Findings
Using CEO pay slice (Bebchuk et al., 2011), CEO tenure, and CEO duality to measure CEO power, the authors show that CEO power is negatively correlated with firm’s choice to engage in CSR …
Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation For Corporate Social Responsibility, Zhichuan Li
Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation For Corporate Social Responsibility, Zhichuan Li
Business Publications
We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shareholder-friendly corporate governance are more likely to provide compensation to executives linked to firm social performance outcomes. Also, providing executives with direct incentives for CSR is an effective tool to increase firm social performance. The findings provide evidence identifying corporate governance as a determinant of managerial …
Endogeneity In Ceo Power: A Survey And Experiment, Zhichuan Li
Endogeneity In Ceo Power: A Survey And Experiment, Zhichuan Li
Business Publications
The endogeneity problem has always been one, if not the only, obstacle to understanding the true relationship between different aspects of empirical corporate finance. Variables are typically endogenous, instruments are scarce, and causality relations are complicated. As the first attempt to summarize different econometric methods that are commonly used to address endogeneity concerns in the context of corporate governance, we explore the relation between CEO power and firm performance, as an experiment, to illustrate how these methods can be used to mitigate the endogeneity problem and by how much. After carefully dealing with the endogeneity issues, we find strong evidence …