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Full-Text Articles in Business
Segment Disaggregation And Equity-Based Pay Contracts, Young Jun Cho, Hojun Seo
Segment Disaggregation And Equity-Based Pay Contracts, Young Jun Cho, Hojun Seo
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We study the role of segment disaggregation in equity-based pay contracts in diversified firms. Disaggregated segment disclosures can improve the observability of managerial actions in internal capital markets and thus increase implicit incentives for managers to allocate resources as desired by shareholders, substituting for explicit incentives provided to CEOs. We use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 as an identification strategy and find that firms affected by this segment reporting mandate significantly decreased the provision of equity-based incentives in the post-adoption period, especially for firms with higher operating volatilities. This effect is also more pronounced for …
Socially Responsible Firms, Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog
Socially Responsible Firms, Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.
Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer
Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Theory and recent evidence suggest that overvalued firms can create value for shareholders if they exploit their overvaluation by using their stock as currency to purchase less overvalued firms. We challenge this idea and show that, in practice, overvalued acquirers significantly overpay for their targets. These acquisitions do not, in turn, lead to synergy gains. Moreover, these acquisitions seem to be concentrated among acquirers with the largest governance problems. CEO compensation, not shareholder value creation, appears to be the main motive behind acquisitions by overvalued acquirers.
Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer
Acquisitions Driven By Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals?, Fangjian Fu, Leming Lin, Micah Officer
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Overvaluation may motivate a firm to use its stock to acquire a target whose stock is not as overpriced (Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). Though hypothetically desirable, these acquisitions in practice create little, if any, value for acquirer shareholders. Two factors often impede value creation: payment of a large premium to the target and lack of economic synergies in the acquisition. We find that overvaluationdriven stock acquirers suffer worse operating performance and lower long-run stock returns than control firms that are in the same industry, similarly overvalued at the same time, have similar size and Tobin’s q, but have not pursued …
Firm Structure And Corporate Cash Holdings, Venkat Subramaniam, Tony Tang, Heng Yue, Xin Zhou
Firm Structure And Corporate Cash Holdings, Venkat Subramaniam, Tony Tang, Heng Yue, Xin Zhou
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We analyze whether the organizational structure of firms (i.e., whether a firm is diversified or focused) affects their cash holdings. Using Compustat firm level and segment-level data, we find that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than their focused counterparts. Our results are robust to industry adjustments at the segment level and to different factors previously found to be important determinants of cash holdings. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and additional robustness tests we are able to attribute the lower cash holdings among diversified firms to complementary growth opportunities across the different segments of these firms and the availability of active internal …
Accounting Conservatism And Managerial Incentives, Young Koan Kwon
Accounting Conservatism And Managerial Incentives, Young Koan Kwon
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
There are two sources of agency costs under moral hazard: (1) distortions in incentive contracts and (2) implementation of suboptimal decisions. In the accounting literature, the relation between conservative accounting and agency costs of type (1) has received considerable attention (cf. Watts 2002). However, little appears to be known about the effects of accounting conservatism on agency costs of type (2) or trade-offs between agency costs of types (1) and (2). The purpose of this study is to examine this void. In a principal-agent setting in which the principal motivates the agent to expend effort using accounting earnings, this study …